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and efficacious resistance to future encroachment or invasion. No measures were taken to strengthen his northern frontier, or to repair the fortresses which had become dilapidated by the operations of the late war; and all the precautions necessary for the future security of his kingdom were neglected. The dreamy tranquillity of Charles, however, was not destined to be of long duration. Having placed himself at the mercy of France, he was speedily called on to take part in the war which that country was again waging against England. The consequence was that the naval power of Spain was encountered and overthrown, that her commerce was ruined, her treasury drained of its resources, and the intercourse with her colonies rendered precarious and uncertain.

The peace of Amiens, which had been regarded by either party as little more than a temporary cessation of hostilities, was, as if by mutual consent, soon broken. France and England, the rival and gigantic powers into whose hands were committed the destinies of the world, had again unsheathed the sword; and it depended on the issue of the approaching conflict, whether the chains, by which Europe was already encircled,

should be riveted or snapped in twain. In such circumstances, it was the natural policy of Spain to have remained neutral. In common with the other weaker countries of Europe, she would gladly have kept aloof from a contest which involved the certainty of immediate sacrifice, while its eventual advantages were only distant and contingent. In a war, however, of such a character, and with objects so vast as the liberation or subjection of the world, it was not to be expected that the rights of neutral powers should be held sacred and inviolate. To remain neutral was, in truth, to encounter all the hazards and sacrifices of war, without participation of its benefits; and the minor states of Europe soon found themselves absorbed in the eddies of a whirlpool, and carried involuntarily forward by an impetus, at once rapid and resistless.

It was not long before the eyes of Spain were opened to the bold and decisive policy of the belligerents. While yet at peace with both parties, four Spanish frigates, loaded with treasure from America, were captured by an English squadron, without any declaration of war. By this flagrant act of national piracy, Spain was at once driven into the arms of France, and war against

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CHAP. I. 1804. Great Britain immediately declared. She saw that, for a mean and unwarrantable purpose, she had been made the object not merely of robbery but of insult; and the unprincipled aggression of England drew from the whole Spanish nation a burst of indignant hatred, which the policy of France led her, by every means, to cherish and prolong.

1805. The throne of France was now filled by Napoleon; and the ascendency of his master-mind contributed to rivet yet more strongly the fetters by which Spain was already shackled. The tone at first assumed by the new Emperor, was intended to lull the Spanish government into still deeper security; and it succeeded. Assurances of friendship, and promises of support, were made with a profusion, and an apparent warmth which seemed to warrant their sincerity; and they were received by Charles, with a credulity quite in harmony with the general imbecility of his character.

The minister to whose hands the reins of government had long been intrusted, was Don Manuel Godoy; and surely never was there a servant less qualified by character and talents, to compensate for the deficiencies of his master.

Raised by the illicit attachment of the Queen from the situation of a private gentleman to the highest rank and office of the state, he brought to the task of governing a great nation, a narrow and uncultivated mind, a grovelling and selfish spirit. He was a man alike devoid of principle and firmness; and the only proof of talent exhibited in his unfortunate career, must be sought in the ascendency, which, under every change of circumstance, he appears to have maintained over the minds of Charles and his consort. By their favour he was first created Duc d'Alcudia, and afterwards, in honour of the treaty of Basle, which he had been chiefly instrumental in concluding, Principe de la Paz. To his hands were committed the direction and patronage of all the departments of the state. Every honour in the power of the monarch to bestow was lavished on the favourite. By his marriage with Marie Therese de Bourbon, the niece of Charles, he was elevated to the rank of royalty; and the state and magnificence of his establishment were such as had never before been affected by a subject.

Some men there are, who, when called on by events to figure in a new and higher sphere of

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action than that for which they were originally destined, experience a proportionate expansion of intellect and power—in whom new energies are elicited by the dangers and the difficulties, which, perhaps by a wise dispensation, are fated to surround and darken the paths of glory and ambition. Such a man was *not* Godoy. In him power called only into development the baser and more grovelling passions of his nature, while all the higher impulses by which humanity is graced and ennobled, slept on in undisturbed repose. Under the sway of such a person it was impossible that Spain should prosper. The honour of the country was sacrificed, her vital interests were disregarded, and the whole functions of the government of a great nation were made to converge towards a single point—the gratification of an unprincipled favourite.

It is scarcely possible to conceive a court more thoroughly dissolute and degraded than that of Madrid under the administration of Godoy. Those only received his favours who pandered to his vices; and all in any degree distinguished by wisdom, virtue, or patriotism, were treated with contumely and neglect. It has been said that he was corrupted by France; yet, there are many

portions of his public conduct and policy at variance with such a supposition. Godoy's was not a lofty ambition: the rank, the wealth, the power he already enjoyed, afforded ample means of sordid gratification, and engrossed the capacities of his nature. France had no bribe of magnitude sufficient to secure the services of a man whose highest aspirations were already sated, to whom future glory, when weighed against present enjoyment, was but as dust in the balance.

For some benefits, however, and these of no trifling magnitude, it is but justice to confess that Spain has been indebted to the administration of Godoy. He increased and accelerated the impulse of the national industry by patronage and encouragement. He extended his protection to artists and men of science; and it was in a great measure through his influence and exertions that vaccination became general in Spain, and was subsequently communicated to her possessions in America. Under his administration the Inquisition lost its terrors; works of national utility were encouraged and promoted; and vigorous and judicious measures were adopted to prevent the dissemination of infectious disease.

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Let the censures of the historian, therefore, on the character of Godoy be severe but discriminating. While he displays the darker and more prominent features of his character in their true colours, let him also do justice to those better qualities, by which, in other circumstances, it might have been brightened and redeemed.

Of Charles it would be yet greater injustice to speak in terms of unmitigated reproach. None of the elements of greatness were mingled in his composition, and his virtues and his vices were alike those of an imbecile intellect. Naturally timid and irresolute, yet of a character in which was mingled much of kindness and benevolence, Charles, had his lot been cast in calmer and more peaceful times, might have reigned in tranquil insignificance, by no means unfavourably distinguished among the tenants of the Spanish throne. But his powers were prodigiously disproportioned to the task imposed on him by the irresistible progress of events. With favouring breezes, and on a summer sea, he might have guided the vessel of the state prosperously on her voyage; but when the elements were abroad in their discord, it required another and more powerful arm, to steer her safely into port.

It was impossible for any minister to be more generally unpopular than Godoy. The ancient nobility regarded him as an upstart; and were alike indignant at his elevation and jealous of his power. By the people at large he was considered the source of all the misfortunes and the degradation by which, since his accession to power, the Spanish name and arms had been stained and humbled. The party thus opposed to the favourite, though strong in numbers were yet stronger in the rank and influence of their leader. Ferdinand Prince of Asturias, the heir-apparent to the throne, had naturally regarded the elevation of Godoy with indignation and disgust. His sentiments were no sooner known than the party opposed to the minister rallied round him as their leader. Under any other than a despotic government it would have been impossible for Godoy to have retained his situation in opposition to the public voice. He must at once have been driven into retirement with ignominy and disgrace. But it is not the least disadvantage of an absolute and unmitigated monarchy, that it is cut off from all sympathy and communion with the people; that the governors and the governed are not "bound, each to each, by natural sympathy;" that the

CHAP. I. portents of approaching eclipse are unseen or dis-
1805. regarded, till the earth is shrouded in darkness, and monarchs are "perplexed by fear of change," which it is no longer in their power to avert.

1806. In 1806 the disorders of the government had at length reached their height: the army, unpaid and without equipment, was clamorous and undisciplined; the navy, which in the preceding reign was formidable, both in point of numbers and efficiency, had been annihilated at Trafalgar; the finances were deranged; the treasury exhausted; and commerce, by the war with England, almost utterly destroyed. Spain had in truth become a mere dependent on France; and the French ruler, far from compassionating her difficulties, still continued to exact fresh sacrifices, and compliances more humble.

Godoy was now fully aware of the perils of his situation; and, could Spain, by any peaceful effort of diplomacy, have been detached from her dangerous and inglorious dependence on France, he would gladly have again raised her from thraldom, and have unbound the ignoble shackles from her limbs. But the difficulties of his situation had become far beyond his feeble powers to overcome. On the one hand, the neg-

lect of all warlike preparation on the part of Spain, the dilapidated state of her frontier fortresses, the total want of the munitions necessary for the defence of her territory if subjected to invasion, withheld him from openly adopting any measure which might incur the hostility of France. On the other hand, from the advanced age of the king, and the aversion of the heir-apparent, he could not but contemplate the probability of a speedy termination to his power. He naturally feared the hostility of an injured people, and dreaded the arrival of the moment when, no longer protected by the shield of regal authority, he should be left the defenceless object of popular indignation.

Stimulated by such fears, Godoy felt it necessary to conciliate public opinion, by the adoption of some immediate measure in unison with the general feeling of the nation. He accordingly proceeded to concert with the Russian and Portuguese ambassadors at Madrid, a plan of combined aggression on the territory of France. The details of this project it is now curious to contemplate. It was proposed that hostile preparations should be made simultaneously at numerous and distant points, and should be conducted

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with such secrecy as to elude the observation of Napoleon, then actively engaged in the war with Prussia. Spain and Portugal were to unite their forces against the common enemy. Arrangements were to be made for assembling a large army in the ports of Great Britain, which, on a given signal, was to be landed on the north of Spain. The operations on land were to be supported by a naval armament of overwhelming magnitude; and, by a simultaneous movement in the north of Europe, Russia was to advance to the relief of Germany, with her whole military power.

In such circumstances, before the armies of Napoleon, engaged in distant operations, could be concentrated for the defence of the kingdom, the allies were unexpectedly to cross the Pyrenees, and, marching direct for Paris, to gain possession of the capital. By these measures it was conceived, that a sudden and decisive blow would be struck in the vital part where France was at once most vulnerable and defenceless.

Such were the projects of the Prince of Peace; and small as the chance might be of maturing, under any circumstances, a scheme so widely ramified, and depending on so many contingencies

for its completion, without exciting the suspicions of Napoleon, all hope of success was at once blighted by his own rashness and precipitation.

Before any of the necessary arrangements had been made, nay even before the powers most interested had been apprized of the part allotted to them in the projected scheme of hostilities, a proclamation was issued by Godoy, exhorting all loyal Spaniards to take arms, and rally round the throne of their sovereign. Circular letters were written to the bishops and civil functionaries of the provinces, urging them to excite the ardour of the people in the cause of their country. The nation, thus called on to defend their sovereign, could perceive no new danger which threatened his throne. The manifesto indicated no enemy against whom they were to arm. They were told of no insult or aggression which it had become necessary to repress or to revenge. The dangers of which it spoke were too indefinite and shadowy to rouse the fears or passions of the people. Its motives and its ends were alike veiled in an obscurity they were unable to penetrate. The nation wondered and were silent.

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The astonishment excited by this warlike demonstration was not confined to Spain. Europe was

CHAP. I. 1806. unprepared for the loud note of gratuitous defiance so suddenly sounded from Madrid. No alliance had been formed, no treaty concluded, no preparation made for any combined attack on the power of France. Even the ministers of Spain at the foreign courts, were left wholly in the dark as to the views and projects of Godoy. The Russian and Portuguese ambassadors on the appearance of this unseasonable proclamation, lost no time in attempting to vindicate themselves from the suspicion of a connivance, which could not fail to draw down upon their governments the indignation of Napoleon. They denied being privy to its contents, and carefully avoided committing themselves, by any future negotiations, to the discretion of a man so manifestly deficient in all the qualities of a statesman.

It was upon the field of Jena that Napoleon received this proclamation—with what feelings may readily be conceived. That which to Europe appeared vague and mysterious, to him was abundantly intelligible. He at once appreciated the policy of Charles and his minister; and then it was, as he afterwards declared, that he first resolved on the subjugation of the Peninsula.

In the meanwhile, the French Ambassador at Madrid presented an indignant remonstrance on the perfidious and vacillating policy of the Spanish government; and Godoy, anxious to escape if possible from the consequences of his rashness, replied by humble assurances that the warlike preparations called for by the proclamation, were intended as a mere defensive measure against the Emperor of Morocco, who, instigated by the intrigues, and emboldened by the protection of England, might possibly attempt a descent on Andalusia. Napoleon, still engaged in a contest which required a concentration of his resources, deemed it politic to receive this lame and improbable explanation as satisfactory. His vows of vengeance slept; but they were soon destined to awake from slumber.

August. The peace of Tilsit, which speedily followed these events, left the French Emperor at full liberty to pursue his ambitious projects with regard to the Peninsula. He assembled a large army on the Garonne, and weakened the defensive powers of Spain, by exacting still larger drafts from her army than she had yet been called on to furnish. Sixteen thousand of her best-disciplined troops, under the command

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of the Marquis de Romana, were marched into the north of Germany, and another division were employed in the occupation of Etruria. While matters were thus silently but rapidly verging toward the catastrophe, Napoleon continued to express his approbation of the conduct of Charles, and to lavish testimonies of his favour on Godoy. Whether the Spanish monarch and his minion were really deceived by these hollow appearances of esteem, it would boot little to ascertain. They were already in the net of the spoiler, and so involved in its multiplied convolutions that escape was impossible.

No submission, however abject, no resistance, however prompt and energetic, could possibly have rescued Spain. It is not improbable that the fall of the Bourbons had already been decreed. Accustomed as Napoleon had been to the enjoyments of gratified ambition, he felt perhaps a new excitement to his pride in the idea that the plebeian brows of a scion of his house, should be graced by one of the highest and most ancient crowns of Europe. It was yet something to a spirit like his, to raise to the level of the noblest of the earth all those whose veins were filled with blood kindred to his own. It was

yet more than this, by a striking act of violent and decisive volition, to prove to Europe, that henceforward her law was to be found in the arbitrary fiat of her master. But it was most of all to beat down, and trample in the dust, the descendants of an hundred kings; to display the full measure of his contempt for those hereditary prejudices, before which the world had hitherto bent in reverence and submission; to stand forth in the indefeasible dignity of his own majestic spirit, with all the moral and intrinsic attributes of sovereignty concentrated in his person, as the man, marked out by nature, whose brow could alone support the diadem, or whose arm could wield the sceptre of the world.

Whether the course of Napoleon, with regard to Spain, was influenced by the instigations of an ambition so wild and reckless, is one of those problems probably never destined to be solved. It is at least certain, there were other motives, and those of cogency more powerful and immediate, to urge him forward on that course of policy which was to terminate in the deposition of the Bourbons.

In deciding on the immediate annexation of Spain, as an appanage of his empire, Napoleon,

CHAP. I. 1807. by many of the political reasoners of the day, has been held guilty, not only of an unprincipled outrage on the law of nations, but of being influenced in his proceedings towards that power, by the mere blind and vague stimulus of conquest. "Spain," say such reasoners, "feeble and inoffensive, was already in his power. Her troops had fought in the same ranks with his own; her resources had been drained to enrich his treasury, and were still at his command. What then had he to gain by outraging the feelings of a people so little capable of disturbing his security, or by deposing a dynasty which he could bend so easily to all the purposes of his ambition?"

The answer is, *much*. Over such a monarch as Charles, and such a minister as Godoy, Napoleon well knew he could exercise no ascendency but that of fear. While his armies continued to advance, as they had hitherto done, in the career of conquest, he had nothing to dread from Spain, and he had dreaded nothing. But he also well knew, that, should the tide of battle change, should the flood of success, on which he had hitherto floated on from attack to victory—from victory to conquest, ebb again from beneath him, Spain would be among the first of the

surrounding nations to unsheath the sword, and raise the battle-cry on his declining fortunes. The proclamation of Godoy had given sufficient indication of her future policy, should adverse contingencies occur to shake the stability of his government, or weaken its power. CHAP. I. 1807.

Had the views of Napoleon, therefore, been directed merely to the present, he could have beheld, in the degraded state of the Peninsula, nothing to excite his alarm. But, regarding the future security of a widely extended empire, he could scarcely fail to consider the acquisition of Spain, as a measure essential to its permanence. The vast increase of territory which France had acquired by conquest, in Italy, and beyond the Rhine, rendered it necessary to her safety, that the circuit of her dominion should be proportionably enlarged in those quarters from which, by a sudden and unexpected invasion, an army might advance into the very centre of the kingdom. On this subject the reasoning of General Foy appears unanswerable:—"Spain presses on France," says that able—would we could likewise add impartial and unprejudiced—writer, "in a way which differs wholly from every other pressure. Surrounded by the sea, and in contact only with a feeble neigh-

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bour, Spain has nothing to fear from any lateral aggression, and, should she become the enemy of France, can bear down with all her strength on the northern frontier.—Napoleon knew, that behind the Pyrenees a generous nation had preserved its energy, and had not sunk into degradation, even under the long oppression of a government inglorious abroad and despotic at home. He knew all that might be expected from the people, and especially from the people of the south, when governed in unison with their passions, and within the sphere of their moral impressions. A man might arise who would regenerate Spain; a prince might reign, who would suffer it to be regenerated; a palace revolution, a popular tumult, might give the impulse. It was not written in the book of fate, that Spain should be always ruled by a weak king, a shameless queen, and a contemptible favourite. While the eagles of France were flying to the banks of the Danube, and urging their course towards the Vistula, an enemy was at her gates on the south. The empire, which is so deeply vulnerable on one point, is strong no where. The increase of territory ought to be effected by concentric additions, and simultane-

ously on all sides. The French armies, when fighting in Poland, Bohemia, and Austria, might be turned by an enemy's army which presented itself on the frontier of the Pyrenees, because that army would be the nearest to Paris. The centre of a kingdom is, in fact, the arc and buttress of its military power. Was not, then, the absolute and firmly-guaranteed submission of Spain, a natural and necessary consequence of the extension of France beyond her natural limits, the Alps and the Rhine? Such were the thoughts suggested to Napoleon by the idle proclamation of Godoy."

The first step taken by Napoleon towards the completion of his project, was to induce Charles, through the agency of his minister, to become a party to a secret treaty which was signed at Fontainebleau. By this instrument the partition of Portugal was agreed on. The province Entre Minho et Douro was to be erected into a separate sovereignty for the king of Etruria, whose Italian dominions were to be ceded to France. The Alentejo and Algarva were allotted as the reward of Godoy, to whom they were conveyed as a separate and independent principality. It was likewise stipulated that the sovereignty

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of the other provinces of Portugal should rest in abeyance, till the termination of the war; then to be restored conditionally to the House of Braganza, or otherwise disposed of, as the pleasure of the contracting powers might dictate. It was further agreed, that the colonies of Portugal should be divided between the sovereigns, on the principle of an equal partition.

Such were the more prominent features of the treaty of Fontainebleau; and on the same day on

App. No. 2.

which it was concluded, a convention was likewise signed, for carrying it into effect. By this it was arranged, that a body of twenty-five thousand French infantry, and three thousand cavalry, should enter Spain, and marching directly on Lisbon, were there to be reinforced by the junction of a Spanish army of twelve thousand men. The troops of Charles were at the same time to take possession of the province Entre Minho et Douro, and the city of Oporto; while a third division was to reduce and hold in occupation the provinces south of the Tagus. It was likewise provided by the convention, that the French troops should, on their march, be furnished with all necessary supplies, at the expense of the Spanish government.

Though the contracting powers appear to have contemplated little probable opposition, to this scheme of iniquitous spoliation, yet, in order to repel any possible attempts of the English to obstruct its execution, it was agreed that an army of reserve of forty thousand men, should assemble at Bayonne, ready to march to the defence of any point which might be menaced with attack.

The secrecy with which they were concluded is not one of the least remarkable circumstances connected with the treaty and convention of Fontainebleau. The negotiations on the part of Spain were conducted by Don Eugenio Izquierdo, a person uninvested with any public character, but enjoying the full confidence of Godoy. Of the powers intrusted to Izquierdo by the King and his minister, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was kept in profound ignorance. All the diplomatic arrangements connected with the treaty, were concluded without his knowledge; nor was it till several of the stipulations had been carried into effect that he first became acquainted with its existence. The instructions which Izquierdo received personally from the King, preparatory to his departure, are sufficiently illustrative both of the feeble character of Charles and his

CHAP. I. unbounded reliance on Godoy, to merit record.
1807. "*Manuel es tu protector*," said the monarch, "*tras quando te diga; por medio suyo debes servir me.*"*

Of Portugal it is now time to speak. Engaged in the peaceful prosecution of an extended commerce, and relying for security on the faith of a treaty of neutrality—the advantages of which were purchased by a large annual tribute to France,—her government had abstained, as much as possible, from mingling in the dissensions of the more powerful nations of Europe. Towards Spain, she had been guilty of no offence; and connected with that power by public alliance, and multiplied intermarriages with the reigning family, the Prince of Brazil imagined that if not entirely secure from insult or partial injustice, his territory was at least safe from glaring outrage and spoliation. He certainly did not, and could not anticipate, that the inoffensive policy of his government, could be followed, on the part of his allies, by an act of power so flagrant and un-

* "Manuel Godoy is thy protector. Do what he orders thee. It is through him that thou must serve me." These are the very words of Charles, given in the correspondence of Izquierdo. Foy, v. ii. p. 333.

justifiable as that contemplated by the stipulations of the treaty of Fontainebleau. CHAP. I. 1807.

The peace of Tilsit had scarcely been concluded, when the French and Spanish ambassadors at Lisbon united in a formal demand, that the ports of the kingdom should be instantly closed against England, that the ships then in harbour should be seized, and the property of all British subjects confiscated. It was likewise intimated to the government of Portugal, that, in case the requisition of the ambassadors was not followed by an immediate compliance, a speedy declaration of war by both powers would be the inevitable consequence. Aug. App. No. 3.

The Prince Regent, unwilling to become the instrument of injustice towards an old and faithful ally, endeavoured, by a temporizing policy, to avert the necessity of immediate acquiescence in this unprincipled demand. He signified to the Court of France his readiness to prevent all future intercourse with England, but objected to the more violent measures prescribed for his adoption. Aware, perhaps, how little weight would be attached by those whom he addressed, to any collateral appeal to justice or the law of nations, the Prince Regent urged, as App. No. 4.

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the chief motive for the line of policy he was anxious to pursue, the fact that a Portuguese squadron was then cruizing in the Mediterranean, and the prudence of maintaining terms with England till it had returned to port.

The feebleness of Portugal, however, rendered all the remonstrances of her government ineffectual. To the confederated power of France and Spain, it was evident she could offer no effectual resistance; and Napoleon, without waiting for the result of her decision, directed an immediate seizure of all Portuguese vessels in the ports of France and Holland. Under these circumstances, notice was given to the English residents in Portugal of the precarious situation in which they stood; and they were warned, by a timely retreat, to escape from the rigorous measures to which, in the urgency of the crisis, it might be found necessary to have recourse.

In the meanwhile, preparations for the invasion of Portugal were proceeding without abatement or delay. An army of twenty-five thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, under the title of the Army of the Gironde, had assembled at Bayonne, and waited only for an order to advance. The government of Portugal was

at once intimidated and overawed; and the Prince Regent, anxious, by every possible concession, to dissipate the darkening cloud which appeared ready to burst in thunder over his devoted kingdom, was at length compelled to sacrifice principle to safety, and purchase, even the chance of impunity, by injustice. His acquiescence in the measures prescribed for his adoption was intimated to the Courts of France and Spain; the property and persons of all subjects of England were seized, and a proclamation was issued prohibiting all commercial intercourse between the countries.

These extorted sacrifices of the Prince Regent, produced no favourable change in his own fortunes or those of Portugal. The dismemberment of the kingdom had already been determined, and the humiliating compliances of the government, tended rather to accelerate than retard the natural progress of events.

Such were the relations of France and the Peninsula, when the family differences which had long existed between Charles and the Prince of Asturias at length approached to an open rupture. The latter was hostile to Godoy, and naturally indignant at the disgraceful causes of his