

the Gaudiana and enter Alentejo. It was im-  
possible, under such circumstances, to retrieve  
the affairs of the province with so limited a  
force, and Maransin instantly retreated to Mer-  
tola, leaving his baggage, papers, military chest,  
and above one hundred prisoners, in the hands  
of the insurgents.

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

The insurrection had now become general throughout the provinces on the right of the Mondego. At Braga, at Leiria, at Coimbra, and at many other places, the national standard had been reared amid the acclamations of the people. Partial engagements were continually taking place between the natives, and detachments of the intrusive army; and though these, as might be expected, generally terminated in the defeat of the insurgents, yet the spirit of resistance was not quelled. While awed by the presence of an overwhelming force, tranquillity was for a time restored; but no sooner had their enemy retired than the people were again in arms. Thus it was, that though nominally masters of the country, the French, in truth, held only such portions of it, as were immediately occupied by their troops.

The measures of the Junta, for the liberation

CHAP. X. of the kingdom, were vigorous and judicious.

1808.

June.

All the arms in the public depots were distributed to the people; a train of field artillery was equipped; the pay of the army was increased, and the disbanded officers and soldiers were enrolled in new regiments. Generals Bernardin de Freire and Miguel de Forjas, officers of reputed talent, and of known hostility to the usurping government, were assumed into the councils of the Junta, and appointed military leaders. Proclamations, exhorting the people to burst the shackles of their bondage, and to take arms in the cause of liberty and their country, were circulated through the provinces. The Viscount de Balsemao was sent ambassador to England, to entreat the assistance of that power; and a correspondence was opened with the Junta of Galicia.

While the country was thus torn by violent convulsion, Lisbon, the very seat and centre of the invader's power, was not tranquil. The fete of the Corpus Christi, is one which had uniformly been celebrated in the capital with extraordinary pomp. On that day the whole population of the city, increased by large accessions from the surrounding country, were annually collected

to witness the procession. Nothing could exceed its magnificence. The streets were strewn with flowers, the walls decorated with tapestry, and the balconies displayed all of beauty and splendour which the country could afford. On that solemn occasion, not only the wealth of individuals, but the vast treasures of the church were displayed, to add pomp to the festival.—

The most prominent figure in the pageant was an image of St. George, glittering with jewels, mounted on a horse gorgeously caparisoned, and followed by a cavalcade of the royal household. Throngs of penitents and monks, duly marshalled in the procession, formed a train so numerous as to occupy several hours in passing. The corporations of arts and trades, the senate, the tribunals, the councils, the regular troops, the generals, and the militia, followed in succession. Then came the consecrated Host, preceded by knights in their mantles, and covered by a splendid canopy, borne by the chief dignitaries of the church, in all the pomp and circumstance of canonical splendour. Last of all came the Sovereign, the Princes of his family, and the grandees, on foot, without guards, and

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

CHAP. X. mixed, as it were, with the great body of the people.

June.

This festival, Marshal Junot deemed it impolitic to abolish. He considered that any prohibition would probably be attributed to fear, and tend to increase the instability of the new government. On the day appointed, therefore, the procession took place, though shorn of its chief honours by the absence of the Sovereign, in whose place Junot did not think it prudent to appear, and of the figure of St. George, whose dress had been carried off to Brazil.— In all other circumstances the splendour of the pageant was undiminished. Cannon were fired from the castle in demonstration of respect, the streets were lined by the French troops, and the procession, in all wonted formality, had begun its progress, when, at the moment when the sacred Host was seen issuing from the Church of St. Domingo, the crowds in the squares of the Commercio and the Rocio, became vehemently agitated, and the commotion spread like wildfire through every street in the city. For this sudden perturbation there was no apparent cause. No symptom of hostility had been

previously manifested, on the part either of the military or the people. But in a moment, from some unknown and even now inexplicable cause, the whole aspect of affairs was changed. Cries of terror arose among the multitude, and were instantly reverberated by many thousand voices. Some exclaimed, "There is an earthquake, the city is about to be destroyed;" others, "The English are landed;" but the greater number were influenced by the apprehension of a general massacre, and invoked their countrymen to resist bravely to the last.

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

Among the vast multitudes which thronged the city, all was panic and confusion. Priests, nobles, penitents, and monks, in a moment deserted the procession, and mingling amid the crowd, carried with them the remains of broken crucifixes and tapers, strewing the streets with the fragments of their torn vestments. The insignia of the festival were overthrown and trampled under foot. Multitudes, actuated by blind terror, encountered each other like opposing torrents, and obstructed all avenues of escape. The disorder pervaded all ranks. The prelate who bore the Host deserted the sacred incarnation, and, returning into the church, was

CHAP. X. found concealed behind a screen. All participated  
1808. alike in the indefinite and pervading terror, and  
June. fled with tumultuous dismay.

During the progress of this extraordinary convulsion, Marshal Junot was in the Palace of the Inquisition. He immediately went to the church of St. Domingo, and endeavoured to rally the fugitive prelates and nobles, who had fled to that sanctuary for protection. He perceived that it was most important that the procession should at all events take place, as the best means of allaying the apprehensions of the people. Without waiting to inquire into the causes of the disorder, he gave the strongest assurance that the French troops should afford protection from violence, and declared his intention of joining the *cortege*. The procession accordingly again set forth, and symptoms of disorder were again manifested. The ceremonies of the day, however, were at length concluded with decency and order. On the return of Junot to head-quarters, amid throngs of people, a few voices saluted him with cheers,—the last he was ever destined to receive in Portugal.\*

---

\* The causes of this singular tumult, have never yet been discovered. Thiebault attributes it to an organized system of con-

Surrounded by increasing difficulties, Junot called a council of war, and the result of their deliberations, was, a resolution to concentrate the army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and abandon all the fortresses in the kingdom, with the exception of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Setubal. But even this resolution presented considerable difficulties in the execution. The communication, between the different branches of the army, was intercepted by the hostile population of the intervening provinces.

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

Thiebault.

Loison was at Guarda, when he at length received one out of many despatches directing his return to Lisbon. In his attempt to reach Oporto he had been unfortunate. On the sixteenth of June, he had received orders to assume the command at Oporto; and, leaving a garrison in Almeida, under General Charlot, on the day following he commenced his march, with two battalions of light infantry, fifty dragoons, and six pieces of artillery.

Jun. 16.

---

spiracy; but this hypothesis is irreconcilable with many of the circumstances. The people were naturally suspicious of the designs and the good faith of their invaders. They saw themselves surrounded by an armed force, and at the mercy of its leader. In a multitude terror is contagious, and when the mine is laid, a spark is sufficient to explode it.

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

Jun. 23.

31. 1808.

Jun. 30.

During the first four days of his march, Loison encountered no impediment. On the twenty-first he crossed the Douro at Regora, and halted at Rezamfrio. There he learned that the mountaineers, in considerable force, were prepared to dispute the strong country in his front; and, under the influence of alarm, he determined on retreating. But even this measure was not unaccompanied with danger. His baggage had been already attacked; and masses of armed peasants flocked from the surrounding mountains to obstruct and harass his retreat. At Castro d'Airo an engagement took place, in which the peasants, from want of discipline, encountered considerable loss; and the march of the French army to Celorico was no longer molested. At Celorico, Loison divided his army, and despatched one half to Trancoso, while with the other he proceeded to Guarda, where his stay was cut short by the receipt of Junot's order, for the concentration of the army round the capital.

On the thirtieth of June, Loison halted at Pinhel, and on the day following at Almeida. In that city he left his sick, and a garrison of twelve hundred and fifty men; and, having dilapi-

dated the fort Conceiçam, he commenced his retreat on Lisbon. CHAP. X.

At Guarda, Loison had reckoned on a friendly reception. In this he was deceived. On approaching the city, he found a body of peasants drawn up, and prepared, with an old piece of rusty artillery, found in the rubbish of the castle, to dispute his entrance. An immediate attack was ordered. The approach of the French spread confusion through the ranks of the insurgents; and they were speedily driven from their position with great loss. The slaughter was unsparing,—above a thousand men were left dead on the field. The flying peasants were pursued along the streets of Guarda, which the French entered without further opposition; and their success was followed by the usual scenes of massacre and pillage.

1808.

July.

Jul. 3.

Thiebault.

On the fourth of July, Loison continued his retrogressive movement on Lisbon. On the day following, an engagement took place at Alpedrinham. The insurgents occupied a position of considerable strength, and had thrown up redoubts on the face of the hill leading to the village. But their flanks were unsupported; and

Jul. 4.

CHAP. X. a battalion having turned their right, the position became untenable; and, after a strenuous but fruitless resistance, the insurgents were put to flight. Their loss, on this occasion, was considerable, and included their leader, the Capitao Mor, whose body was discovered among the slain. From Alpedrinham, Loison encountered no further obstacle in his retreat, except that arising from the extreme difficulty of procuring supplies, in a country decidedly hostile.

1808.  
July.

Jul. 11. On the eleventh he reached Abrantes.

The Alentejo had now risen in arms. At Villa Viçosa the people attacked a detachment of French troops, quartered in the town, and forced them to retire into the castle. General Leite, who had lately governed the province, was now selected as military leader; but that officer, aware of the narrow extent of the resources which the natives could oppose to the power of the intruders, declined the responsibility of command. The choice of the multitude then fell on Antonio de Lacerda, an old officer, who took such measures as seemed best suited to the danger of the time. Messengers were despatched to solicit aid from Badajoz; and

Jun. 23.

marksmen were stationed on the top of the Con-  
 ceição church, and other points which com-  
 manded the castle.

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

General Kellerman, who commanded in the  
 province, no sooner received intelligence of  
 these events, than he despatched a force to re-  
 lieve the troops driven into the castle. A dread-  
 ful massacre took place. The insurgents were  
 routed; and the French, entering the city at the  
 charge, put the inhabitants to the bayonet with-  
 out discrimination. Upwards of two hundred  
 were killed in the streets; the place was given  
 up to pillage, and twelve of the prisoners were  
 put to death as ringleaders, in what, by a singu-  
 lar abuse of language, was designated *rebel-  
 lion*.

Jun. 25.

Lacerda fled to Olivença with a few followers,  
 where he found a Spanish force, under command  
 of General Moretti. By the latter, an attack  
 was immediately determined upon the fort of  
 Juramenha, which commands the passage of the  
 Guadiana. This was successful. Moretti re-  
 ceived assistance from Badajos; and Kellerman,  
 not aware of the weakness of the garrison, did  
 not venture on any serious attempts to regain  
 possession of the fort.

CHAP. X. The fortunate result of this operation, and the hurried evacuation of Algarve by the enemy, gave spirit to the people. Proclamations, exciting the population to take arms, were circulated on all hands; and it became evident, from the increasing resistance in every quarter to French authority, that the cruelties perpetrated at Villa Viçosa had signally failed of their anticipated effect.

No change of policy, however, took place. The people of Beja rose against the enemy, and massacred two French soldiers, belonging to a detachment which the day before had entered their city. This criminal excess was followed by a dreadful retribution. Maransin defeated the insurgents and entered the town. It was pillaged and burned, and a great proportion of the inhabitants put to the sword. Upwards of twelve hundred slain were found in the streets. The loss of the French on this occasion amounted only to thirty killed and fifty wounded.\*

---

\* There is something, we think, approaching to the facetious, in the gravity with which General Thiebault obtrudes the following anecdote upon the credulity of his readers. "Il y eut même à Beja une circonstance qui peut être rapportée. Un brave religieux de cette ville ayant profité du triste tableau qu'elle offroit après le combat, pour faire sentir aux habitans combien ils avo-

But it was not alone to such barbarous ex- CHAP. X.  
cesses, and the unsparing exercise of the strong  
arm of military violence, that Junot trusted for  
the subjugation of Portugal. He endeavoured  
to enlist religion in his cause, and prevailed on  
the Patriarchal Chapter to denounce excommu-  
nication against all those who should venture,  
directly or indirectly, to encourage the spirit of  
rebellion which had gone abroad. To oppose  
the usurpation of Napoleon was declared to be  
a crime against God; and the divine mission of  
the French Emperor to regenerate Portugal,  
was obtruded as an article of faith on the credu-  
lity of the people.

1808.  
July.

This ecclesiastical missive failed of its in-  
tended effect, and was treated with contempt,  
if not ridicule, by those to whom it was ad-  
dressed. Ignorant and credulous as the people  
were, they could not swallow the monstrous  
absurdity, that the Deity was enlisted in the

---

ient provoqué leur malheur, produisit un si grand effet, que  
tout l'auditoire fondit en larmes, et qu'on le députa à l'unanimité  
auprès du général en chef, pour lui présenter une adresse, dont  
le but étoit d'implorer sa clémence, et de jurer fidélité."

To produce such an effect upon such an occasion, the *brave  
religieux* of General Thiebault must indeed have been an accom-  
plished and eloquent master of pulpit rhetoric.

CHAP. X. cause of rapine and oppression ; or that men, who disgraced humanity by the perpetration of the most criminal atrocities, could be held invested with peculiar sanctity, as the favoured instruments of the divine will. Above all, they remembered that these men had insulted their religion, and extended robbery even to the altar ; and the denunciation of a timid and obsequious hierarchy, was attributed to its true cause, and served rather to exacerbate than soften the hostile feelings of the people.

---

1808.

July.

It was, in truth, to the very ignorance and superstition of the Portuguese nation, that much of the ardour and confidence which supported them, in the almost hopeless struggle in which they had embarked, may be attributed. They knew nothing of the relative strength and resources of nations. They were unable to calculate the ordinary probabilities of ultimate success or failure. Their reliance was not merely on human instruments of defence. The army of saints militant were inlisted on the side of freedom and religion. They fought with the conviction, that the justice of their cause would be vindicated by miraculous interposition.— Even amid the depression of multiplied de-

feats, their confidence was unabated. The CHAP. X.  
 swords of the seraphim were seen waving in  
 the sky, ready to cleave their oppressors to the 1808.  
 dust. Secret ministers of vengeance were July.  
 preparing terrible retribution for the blood of  
 their slaughtered countrymen. The legends  
 of St. Sebastian, which had long slumbered in  
 the hearts of the people, were remembered in  
 the days of their oppression; and the belief  
 spread, that the hour of their accomplish-  
 ment was at hand. The people flew to arms  
 with the deep and immutable conviction, that  
 their long lost monarch was again to appear;  
 and, leading his subjects to the field, should  
 scatter their invaders, like chaff before the wind,  
 and re-establish their monarchy in glory and  
 freedom.

This was the idle creed of an oppressed, an ignorant, and a superstitious people. Sebastian came not; but in their own courage and constancy, they found a nobler deliverance. In the annals of the struggle they maintained, they have left the world a memorable lesson, which conquerors will do well to remember, and the conquered never will forget.

Nearly at the same time with the event we

CHAP. X. have narrated, a body of insurgents had collected at Leiria; and Junot, willing if possible to effect by conciliation their return to obedience, despatched emissaries from Lisbon, with promises, in case of immediate submission, that past offences should be forgotten. No good consequences, however, ensued from the mission. The messengers were driven back by the populace; and General Margaron, with a force of about four thousand men and six pieces of cannon, was directed to quell the insurrection.

1808.  
July.  
On the second of July, that officer set out from Lisbon. On the fourth he arrived at Leiria. A mob of peasants, the greater proportion of whom were without fire-arms or military equipments, alone presented itself to oppose him. A few musquet shots were fired, and the peasantry took to flight. This was the signal for slaughter. The troops of Margaron entered the city on all sides, and the unresisting inhabitants were indiscriminately massacred. Mercy was implored in vain. Neither the claims of age nor sex were respected. The savage and unnatural fury of the victors, spared not even women and babes,—all were butchered. When

Jul. 4.

the slaughter in the streets had ceased, the houses, the churches, and the gardens were ransacked for victims, who were carried to a small square in front of the church of St. Bartholomew, for the purpose of being more compendiously massacred. There the scene of Jaffa was repeated, with additional circumstances of atrocity. The slaughter of these miserable wretches commenced with the bayonet and sword, and was concluded by the bullet and the butt-end of the musquet.

CHAP. X.

1808.

July.

If the infamy of proceedings, so utterly diabolical, can be aggravated by a gratuitous superfoetation of insulting falsehood, even to this extent does General Margaron stand convicted. He addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants, claiming gratitude for his clemency. While the streets of Leiria were yet red and reeking with the blood of the unresisting victims of a general and atrocious butchery, he declared himself to have been actuated only by the dictates of a godlike mercy. "Examine," says this smooth-tongued barbarian, "without partiality, your own conduct and mine; and decide whether those best promote your interest, and are most worthy of your confidence, who, abusing the

CHAP. X. sacred name of country and religion, provoke  
 1808. you to murder and insurrection; or he who,  
 July. even when provoked by outrage, limits his severity to the moment of a just and legitimate defence, and only makes you conscious of your errors in order to pardon them." It was by such means that the iron of oppression was made to enter most deeply into the hearts of the gallant Portuguese.

Under these circumstances, the tide of insurrection flowed onward with augmented force and rapidity. In Alentejo not more than twenty days had elapsed since Kellerman's departure, and the province was again in arms. By the influence of the Spanish General Moretti, and of General Leite—who had at first refused to sanction the resistance of the populace at Villa Viçosa, but had subsequently joined the standard of his  
 Jul. 16. country—a Junta was formed at Evora, by which supreme authority was to be exercised over the provinces on the south of the Tagus. By this body such troops as could be collected were assembled round the city, and circular letters were despatched to the local Juntas, demanding recognition and obedience.

But Loison was already advancing to quell

the insurrection in this quarter. For this purpose he had been recalled from Leiria; and with a force of about five thousand men, was directed to put down the insurgents in Alentejo, to victual Elvas; and then, crossing the Tagus at Santarem or Abrantes, to proceed against Coimbra, in order to inflict severe punishment on the rebellious inhabitants of that city.

Loison had already crossed the Tagus, and was rapidly approaching Evora, before the inhabitants of that city became aware of their danger. Applications were immediately made for assistance from Campo Mayor and Badajos, but without effect. The French came on.

When they approached Montemor Novo, a body of troops, which had been stationed there by General Leite, rapidly retreated, and were met by a reinforcement of four hundred men, then marching to their assistance. Both fell back to Evora, and entered the city, exclaiming they were betrayed. The cry flew from lip to lip; the spirit and hopes of the people were suddenly depressed, and they became violent and tumultuous. The Corregidor, who had become the peculiar object of popular suspicion, escaped from the city; and a small reinforcement

CHAP. X.

1808.

July.

Jul. 28.

CHAP. X. of Spanish troops having arrived during the night, order was again restored. The amount of the patriotic force was about eighteen hundred men, of which more than one-half consisted of peasants newly embodied, and ignorant of military discipline.

1808.

July.

Jul. 29.

On the following morning, the enemy was seen approaching Evora ; and General Leite immediately placed his troops in position, and made preparation for battle. The ground thus occupied was about a mile in front of the city, and consisted of a range of heights extending from the Mill of San Bento to the Quinta dos Cucos, near the ruined Castle of Evora. The Spanish troops were formed as a reserve, behind the hill of San Caetano, on which rested the centre of the army. The artillery, partly Spanish and partly Portuguese, was stationed somewhat in the rear of the left.

Loison, having reconnoitred the position thus occupied, directed an immediate attack. General Solignac, accordingly, advanced to turn the right of the insurgents, while Margaron's brigade, divided into two bodies, made a simultaneous attack on the front and left. Both were successful. The Portuguese infantry fought

well, and were only overpowered after a stren- CHAP. X.  
uous resistance, in which the cavalry afforded  
them no support. The latter fled without wait- 1808.  
ing for attack, and, accompanied by General July.  
Leite, reached Olivença. The infantry, driven  
from their position, fell back on the city, where  
they again attempted a stand. Cannon were plac-  
ed in battery to defend the gate of the Rocio,  
the only one which had not been walled up. But  
the works of the city were old and ruinous, and  
the brigade of Solignac effected an entrance with  
facility. In these circumstances, the Spanish  
troops fled; and many even of the Portuguese,  
scared by the terrors of an assault, were glad to  
escape from the city without offering resistance.  
Yet Evora was not gained without a struggle.  
War was waged on the assailants from the roofs  
and windows of the houses; and a body of volun-  
teers, commanded by Gallego, offered desperate  
resistance in the streets.

At length, however, the scene of contest be-  
came one of massacre and pillage. All that  
remained in the city were slaughtered in cold  
blood; and the fugitives, in their endeavour to  
escape, were charged by the cavalry, and put  
unsparingly to the sword. No sanctuary was

CHAP. X. respected. Thousands of unfortunate wretches  
 1808. were dragged from their places of refuge,  
 July. and became the victims of a licentious soldiery,  
 animated by an ungovernable desire of plunder  
 and revenge. In this affair, the loss of the Por-  
 Thiebault. tuguese amounted to eight thousand killed or  
 wounded in the battle and subsequent massacre.

From Evora, Loison advanced to Elvas, in order to drive back the numerous Spanish parties which infested the neighbourhood of that fortress, and form magazines of provisions for the supply of the capital. From thence he returned to the right bank of the Tagus, and had reached Thomar, when the execution of his projected operations was arrested, by intelligence that an English army had already landed on the coast.

## CHAPTER XI.

## FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

ON the twelfth of July, 1808, an armament, whose destination was the Peninsula, sailed from Cork. It consisted of about twelve thousand men, and was commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose fame, as the conqueror of Assaye, had marked him out as a fitting leader on a service so difficult and perilous.

The expedition sailed; but it had no sooner cleared the coast, than Sir Arthur Wellesley separated himself from the fleet, and repaired in a frigate to Corunna, where he arrived on the twentieth. At Corunna he received intelligence that the Spaniards had sustained a signal defeat at Rio Seco, and that the French were thus enabled to prevent all communication between

CHAP. XI.

1808.

July.

Jul. 20.

CHAP. XI. Galicia and the country to the south and east  
of the Douro. The chief object of Sir Arthur  
1808. Wellesley was to confer with the provincial  
July. Junta, and concert with them a scheme of  
operations, by which the armament he com-  
manded might act with the greatest efficacy  
and advantage to the general cause. The  
offer of immediate co-operation, made by the  
British general, was declined by the Junta.  
Their only wants, they said, were money, arms,  
and ammunition. They were already rich in  
brave hearts and sinewy frames, though poor in  
those resources by which alone the ardour and  
devotion of the people could be brought to ex-  
ercise an immediate and decisive influence on  
the circumstances of the war. They suggested  
Portugal as affording a preferable sphere for the  
operation of the British army, and represented  
the expulsion of the enemy from that kingdom,  
as the most acceptable and important service  
which Sir Arthur Wellesley could render to the  
patriots of the whole peninsula. The Junta  
likewise recommended that he should land in  
the north of Portugal, in order to effect a junc-  
tion with the Portuguese troops, which the gov-

ernment of Oporto were known to have collected in the neighbourhood of that city. CHAP. XI.

In compliance with the wishes of the Gallician Junta, Sir Arthur sailed for Oporto, where he arrived on the twenty-fourth, and had an immediate conference with the Bishop and chief military authorities. By them he was informed that the force in Oporto amounted altogether to about three thousand men, and that a body of five thousand regulars was stationed at Coimbra, on the co-operation of which, though deficient in arms and equipment, Sir Arthur Wellesley was assured he might rely. He was likewise informed, that the remainder of the Portuguese troops, amounting to about fifteen hundred men, and a Spanish force somewhat greater in number, then on its march from Galicia, were to be employed for the defence of the province of Tras os Montes, against Bessieres.

At Oporto, Sir Arthur Wellesley received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, soliciting an interview, before the point of debarkation for the army, or the plan of its subsequent operations should be finally arranged. On the morning of the twenty-fifth he quitted Oporto, and having directed the fleet to rendezvous off the Mondego,

1808.

July.

Jul. 24.

Jul. 25.

CHAP. XI. proceeded to Lisbon, where he found despatches  
1808.  
July. from General Spencer, stating that, in compli-  
ance with the request of the Supreme Junta, he  
had landed his corps at St. Mary's, near Cadiz ;  
but had not consented to commit his army by  
forming a junction with Castanos. Sir Arthur,  
rightly judging that the general success of the  
war would be best promoted by the concentration  
of the British forces, instantly despatched orders  
to General Spencer to embark his troops without  
delay, and join the armament on the coast of  
Portugal, unless he should be engaged in an  
operation which could not be relinquished with-  
out compromising the safety of the Spanish  
army.

After mature deliberation, Sir Arthur deter-  
mined on landing in Mondego Bay. The coast  
of Portugal, between the Tagus and the Douro,  
affords few facilities for the debarkation of an  
army. The shore is in general rugged and dan-  
gerous, and the entrance of the rivers is al-  
most uniformly obstructed by bars, which pre-  
vent their being found serviceable in navigation.  
Under such circumstances, it would have been  
peculiarly dangerous to have attempted so diffi-  
cult and precarious an operation as that of land-

ing the troops, in the immediate neighbourhood of a considerable body of the enemy. A part of the army might have been attacked on shore while the state of the weather prevented the debarkation of the remainder; and it was certain, that by commencing operations in the vicinity of Lisbon, the English army, for a time at least, would be deprived of the expected cooperation of the Portuguese troops. The Fort of Peniche, which stands on a small peninsula, about seventy miles north of Lisbon, alone offered a bay equally safe and accessible; but the anchorage was completely commanded by the guns of the fort, and a landing in that quarter could not have been effected without considerable loss. The choice then fell on Mondego Bay; and fortified in his selection of this point by the opinion of the Admiral, Sir Arthur again joined the fleet, then off the mouth of the Mondego.

By despatches from England, Sir Arthur learned that a reinforcement of five thousand men, under command of Brigadier-General Acland, might be speedily expected; and that the force then acting in Sweden, under Sir John Moore, was likewise directed to repair to Portugal. The command of the army, thus power-

---

 1808.

July.

CHAP. XI. fully augmented, Sir Arthur was likewise informed, would be assumed by Sir Hew Dalrymple.

1808.

August.

The landing of the troops commenced on the first of August, and was not completed without difficulty. The wind had been fresh for several days; and the surf—from which the shelving of the Bay afforded little protection—beat on the shore with such violence as to render the service one of difficulty and danger.

Aug. 6.

On the sixth, the army was augmented by the arrival of the force of General Spencer, who, without waiting for orders, had immediately quitted Cadiz on learning the surrender of Dupont. In the meanwhile, the weather had become more moderate, and the landing of the whole army was effected on the seventh.

Before the British army commenced its advance, Sir Arthur Wellesley held a conference with the Portuguese generals, at Montemor Velho. He then acquainted them with his plans; and informed himself, by personal inspection, of the numbers, discipline, and equipment of their troops. In order to render them as effective as possible, he offered such a sum, from the military chest, as the exigencies of his