

stances, and in the situation selected by Cuesta. CHAP. VIII  
 His true policy, unquestionably, was, to have  
 remained in the mountains of Leon or Galicia,\*

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July.

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\* We learn from the valuable appendix to the history of Colonel Napier, that the anxiety of Napoleon, with regard to the issue of the operations of Bessieres, was intense. In his communications to Savary, he uniformly expresses his conviction, that Leon and Galicia were the only points from which a vital stab might be inflicted on the power of France in the Peninsula. In one letter he says, "Le but de tous les efforts de l'armée doit être de conserver Madrid. C'est là qu'est tout. Madrid ne peut être menacé que par l'armée de Galice."—"Un échec que recevrait le General Dupont serait peu de chose; un échec que recevrait le Marechal Bessieres serait plus considerable et se ferait sentir à l'extrémité de la ligne."

In another document we find the same opinions even more strongly expressed:—"Q'importe que Valence soit soumis? Q'importe que Saragosse soit soumis? Mais general le moindre succès de l'ennemi du côté de la Galice aurait des inconveniens immenses."

The following extract, from a note dictated by the Emperor, will shew his opinion of the difficulties which must have attended the invasion of Galicia:—"S'il (Bessieres,) obtenait à Benavente et à Leon un grand succès contre l'armée de Galice, peut-être serait-il convenable pour profiter de la victoire, et de la terreur de premiers moments, de se jeter dans la Galice."

So hazardous a measure, as entering Galicia with so limited a force as that of Bessieres, is here considered by Napoleon as only advisable in case Bessieres should previously have achieved a great victory, and the movement could be effected before the "terreur de premiers moments" should have subsided. It is therefore evident, that had Blake and Cuesta retired, without fighting, to the Gallician mountains, the French army would not have ventured to attack them.

CHAP. VIII where, in an intrenched position, he might have  
1808. bid defiance to any force with which Bessieres  
July. could have assailed him. If we assume him—as  
we must do—to have been aware of the events  
then passing in the south, his conduct becomes  
still more censurable. Though, possibly, he  
might not have foreseen a success so brilliant  
and decisive as that of Baylen, yet he might,  
and ought to have known, that the situation of  
Dupont was one of almost irretrievable difficulty  
and danger, and to have calculated on the pro-  
bability of the army of Castanos being speedily  
disposable for more distant and extended opera-  
tions. But relying on the numerical superiority  
of his troops, Cuesta forgot that more than half  
of these were nothing better than raw and un-  
disciplined levies, and advanced into the open  
country to encounter an enemy, with whom,  
when unassisted by strong advantages of posi-  
tion, it was abundantly evident he was unequal  
to cope.

After the battle of Rio Seco, the differences  
which had existed between Blake and Cues-  
ta, occasioned the immediate separation of their  
forces. The former fell back on his posi-  
tion at Manzanal, while Cuesta marched for

Leon. Neither were pursued. The energy of Bessieres seemed to have evaporated in the battle ; and General Lasalle, who, with the cavalry, was engaged in full pursuit, received orders to return. During the fourteenth and fifteenth, the army halted at Rio Seco, and subsequently, by easy marches, advanced to Benevente, which it did not reach till the twentieth. In that city he remained till the twenty-second, when he proceeded to Mayorga, where his army was reinforced by the addition of ten thousand men.

Cuesta had left Leon for Toro and Salamanca ; and Bessieres received orders to follow Blake into Galicia. With this view, he had advanced to Puente Orvigo, when intelligence reached him of the defeat of Baylen. By this event, an entire change of operations was rendered necessary.

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1808.

July.

Jul. 22.



## CHAPTER IX.

## ADVANCE OF JOSEPH TO MADRID.

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1808.

June.

THE assembly of Notables lent themselves, as might be expected, to all the purposes of the Emperor. The organization of this body was regulated by the Supreme Junta of Government; and the Church, the army, and the nobility of the higher and lower orders, sent their quota of representatives to bear part in the solemn farce about to be enacted at Bayonne.

Jun. 7.

On the seventh of June, the intrusive monarch of Spain arrived on the scene, and received the homage of all the Spanish deputies already in the city. These formed themselves into classes, according to their respective ranks, and waited on the new sovereign with addresses of congratulation.



The fifteenth was the day fixed for the con- CHAP. IX.  
 vocation of the Notables. The meeting consist-  
 ed of eighty-six members. Don Miguel de Az- 1808.  
 anza, ex-minister of finance, was appointed Pres- June.  
 ident, and Don Mariano Louis d'Urquijo, Vice-  
 president and Secretary. Both were men of tal- Nellerto.  
 ent, both were of the party of Ferdinand; but  
 considering the Bourbon dynasty at an end, and  
 hoping to extract benefit to their country even  
 from her misfortunes, they were willing, in the  
 necessity of the times, to transfer their allegiance  
 to the new monarch.

The character of Joseph seemed eminently  
 calculated to allay the popular antipathy to the  
 new government. Mild and generous in dis-  
 position, pleasing in manners, with a mind en-  
 larged by study, and a knowledge of the world  
 rarely within the reach of hereditary monarchs  
 to acquire, he apparently possessed every quality  
 by which the happiness of his subjects could be  
 promoted or ensured. Under a new dynasty,  
 the evils of former misgovernment might be cor-  
 rected. The institutions of antiquated tyranny,  
 which had hitherto retarded the advance of  
 Spain in knowledge and civilization, might be re-  
 placed by others better fitted to draw forth her

CHAP. IX. resources, and enable her to reassume that rank  
among nations which her natural advantages en-  
titled her to hold. Napoleon had promised  
Spain a constitution, which should separate the  
treasure of the state from the property of the  
king ; which should draw a salutary line of de-  
marcation between the legislative and executive  
powers, and establish the independence of the  
judicial order : a form of government, in short,  
which should encourage the diffusion of know-  
ledge among the people ; science, commerce, ag-  
riculture, and the arts ; all that can increase the  
wealth of a nation, or lend grace to its enjoy-  
ment.

It was natural that those who anticipated such  
benefits from the accession of Joseph to the  
throne should support his cause. Yet it is  
now evident they reasoned falsely, and regu-  
lated their conduct on principles inapplicable  
to the circumstances of their country. They  
either knew little of the temper and spirit of  
the Spanish nation, or knowing, underrated its  
energy. They might and should have known  
that the hearts and voices of the people were in  
favour of their ancient dynasty ; that a constitu-  
tion, however excellent, is not to be thrust on an

unwilling nation by the bayonet, or disseminat-  
 ed from the cannon's mouth. A nation cannot  
 be bullied into freedom. They must know and  
 feel their rights, before they can enjoy them ;  
 and, least of all, can this sense of their privileges  
 be successfully imparted to a people by a series  
 of proceedings, in themselves a violation of them  
 all. In supporting the cause of the intrusive  
 monarch, these men betrayed, without benefiting  
 their country. They contributed, what in them  
 lay, to spread war and havoc through her pro-  
 vinces. The course they followed was devious,  
 yet not smooth ; it was not the path of loyalty,  
 nor of freedom—scarcely that of honour. Never  
 were the calculations of the wise more effectually  
 put to shame, by the honest, unswerving firm-  
 ness of the ignorant. Yet surely not in this igno-  
 rant, that they acted on a deep sense of  
 inalienable right, and rather than their native  
 soil should be defiled by the tread of the op-  
 pressor, bedewed it with their blood.

Let us not, however, be unjust. That many of  
 those who supported the new dynasty by their in-  
 fluence and counsels, did so from pure and consci-  
 entious motives, we know from their private cor-  
 respondence ; and we know also that many, in

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June.

Nellerto.



CHAP. IX. the long and fearful struggle which ensued, nobly redeemed their error by joining the standard of their country, and hazarding life and fortune in her cause.\*

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June.

One of the first acts of the council of Notables was to recognise Joseph as king of Spain and the Indies, and present an address of congratulation. The reply of the intrusive sovereign gave expression to sentiments of moderation and benevolence which might confer honour on the most *legitimate* of despots. He wished only to reign, he said, for the good of Spain. To that object should all his efforts be directed. He would not cross the Pyrenees as the partisan of a party. All his subjects had a right to equal justice, and they should all enjoy it. He knew the honour and generosity of the Castilian character. It was his ambition to be regarded as the father, not as the tyrant of his people.

While Bayonne thus presented the extraor-

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\* Among others, the Duke del Infantado and the Marquis de la Romana. Nellerto gives several letters of the latter, in which he declares the new dynasty to be a *blessing* to his country. That such was, at this period, the real opinion of this distinguished patriot there can be little doubt. That he soon changed it there can be less. Yet the tenor of his letters proves that even Romana could play the sycophant.

dinary spectacle of the proudest nobility of Europe, bending in humility before the throne of a plebeian monarch, a circumstance yet more extraordinary gave completion to his triumph.— Ferdinand broke the silence of his retreat at Valencey, in order to congratulate Joseph on his assumption of regal authority. In his own name, and in that of his brother and uncle, he again publicly renounced all pretension to the crown, and felicitated the Spanish nation on the accession of a monarch, adapted, by his talents and his virtues, to promote their prosperity. It is in vain for the advocates of legitimacy, to attempt to palliate the imperishable tarnish of such a document, by attributing it to necessity or violence. Disgrace is never necessary to a brave man; and no one of a spirit prouder than that of a Spanish Bourbon, but would have preferred death to the ignominy of a humiliation so degrading.

The proceedings of such a meeting as that assembled at Bayonne, can possess little interest. At all events, their acts were few, and may be soon enumerated. They acknowledged Joseph as their king; enjoined obedience to his authority; accepted, with trifling modifications,

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July.

Nellerto.



CHAP. IX. the constitution tendered by Napoleon, and regulated the law of future succession to the monarchy. This done, their part in the performance was at an end.

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July.

Before crossing the Pyrenees, Joseph proceeded to appoint his officers of state. To avoid exciting national jealousies, he determined to enter Spain with but a small retinue of Frenchmen. All the important offices connected with the administration were filled by Spaniards. The Prince of Castel Franco, the Dukes Del Infantado, Parque, and Hijar, the Marquesses de Santa Cruz and Hariza, and the Counts de Fernan Nunez, Orgaz, and Castelflorido, and other great names of the monarchy, were invested with the dignities of the new court. The choice of ministers was judicious. Among the number were Azanza, Urquijo, Jovellanos, Mazarredo, and Cevallos. Men more distinguished in talent, or who possessed a higher place in the esteem of their countrymen, Spain did not afford. Blind to the dangers which awaited them, all were ambitious of taking office under the new government, and of giving public demonstration of their zeal in its behalf.

Surrounded by the grandees, and followed by



a numerous suite of noble and distinguished Spaniards, Joseph at length set forth on his journey to Madrid. On entering Spain, he was greeted in every city with congratulations by the civic and provincial authorities; but the people were gloomy and silent. It was the moment when Blake and Cuesta were marching to engage Bessieres, and all hopes were engaged in the event of the approaching contest. Should the Spanish army be victorious, no doubt could be entertained that the usurper would be compelled to re-enter France; and, under such circumstances, all were glad to shun the necessity of compromising their principles or safety, by any shew of allegiance to his authority.

On the day of the victory of Rio Seco, Joseph entered Burgos, and by that event all obstacles to his further advance were at once removed.—

On the twentieth he arrived at Madrid. The municipal authorities came forth in their robes to greet his approach; the houses by which he passed were hung with rich tapestry; laurels over-arched the streets; and it was amid the deafening and joyous clamour of bells, cannon, and military music, that the new monarch entered his capital. All was loud, save the

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CHAP. IX. voices of the people. As the cavalcade passed  
onward to the palace, the streets were silent  
and tenantless. The citizens hid themselves in  
their houses, as if unwilling to behold the living  
image of their country's degradation. They  
well remembered—could they forget?—that the  
throne of this plebeian successor of the Bour-  
bons was based on fraud, perfidy, and massacre.  
The streets through which he rode in triumph  
had been reddened with the blood of their coun-  
trymen. Was it in the nature of the haughty  
and revengeful Spaniards to forget this? Had  
a few short weeks obliterated from their mem-  
ories all records of the second of May? No!  
The people of Madrid did not disgrace the cause  
of honour, loyalty, and justice, by bending at  
the chariot wheels of their oppressor. They  
were, indeed, told that the new monarch came to  
regenerate the country, to reform the abuses of  
a government with which the nation were con-  
tented, proffering immunities which they wanted  
not, and a freedom from oppression which they  
had seldom practically felt. But were they to  
believe that pure waters could flow from so cor-  
rupt a fountain? Was it possible that the u-  
surper, whose very presence in their capital was

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in itself an insult and an outrage; in whom they saw only the tool and minion of an ambition which trampled on all human rights; to which no impediment was sacred, and which recklessly pursued its course, desolating and to desolate, could be greeted by the Spanish nation as the apostle of concord, the chosen minister of blessings, the saviour of their bleeding and lacerated country?

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This was scarcely to be expected. The Spanish government, though despotic, was not oppressive to the great body of the nation. The nobles, almost uniformly attached to the Court, were seldom resident on their estates, which were occupied on easy terms by a flourishing tenantry. The administration of church property was also highly favourable to the peasantry, who suffered little from the impositions of the state, and constituted a body, hardy, warlike, and independent, and attached to a government under which, for a long succession of ages, they had lived tranquil and contented. By them the evils of despotism were but little felt; the trammels on mental freedom narrowed none of their enjoyments; and the victims of the inquisition were generally taken



CHAP. IX. from a class with which they had little communion either of interest or feeling.

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To a people thus situated, the prospect of political regeneration possessed but little charm. Without knowledge, but that taught by their priests, who inculcated the most slavish doctrines, both political and religious, to them a free constitution was, in truth, nothing but a name. No adage is more true than that a people to be free must be enlightened. The sun of liberty does not rise in the zenith, nor pour down the full flood of his unclouded radiance on regions dark and benighted. The twilight of doubtful struggle must precede his appearance. It is by slow degrees that the clouds which obscure his rays are illuminated and dispelled, till at length, mounting in the horizon, he displays the full measure of his glory and effulgence.

The first acts of Joseph on his arrival at Madrid, were directed to attain that popularity of which he evidently stood in need. Alms were profusely distributed to the indigent. Bull-fights were exhibited, the theatres thrown open, and every art was employed to secure the "sweet voices" of the uncourteous populace.

The Council of Castile, in common with all the authorities of the kingdom, were directed to take the oath of fidelity to the new monarch. This, with some inconsistency,\* yet with honourable spirit, the Council declined, and the members of it were, in consequence, excluded from the grand fete, at which the monarch had decided on receiving the congratulations of his more distinguished subjects.

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On the twenty-fourth, Joseph was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies, with every circumstance of pomp and magnificence. On that occasion, however, the Count d'Altamira, the head of one of the most ancient families of Europe, declined performing the functions of his office, as grand standard-bearer, and that duty was, in consequence, discharged by the Marquis del Campo d'Allange, a grandee of principles more pliant and accommodating.

Jul. 24.

With these petty exceptions, all went smoothly at Madrid. The oath of allegiance was taken by the grandees and dignitaries of the kingdom; and the prelates testified their zeal, by offering

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\* The Council of Castile, in several of its acts, had already recognised the new dynasty.

CHAP. IX. personal congratulations to the new tenant of the throne on his assumption of the sceptre.

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But a storm was gathering in another quarter, which suddenly overcast the French horizon at Madrid, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in that city. Intelligence arrived of the surrender of Dupont. The moral influence of this event was not less strongly felt in the capital than in other parts of the kingdom. Many, who in the prosperity of the invaders had joined their cause, now deserted it on the first symptom of misfortune. The Dukes del Parque and Infantado escaped from the city in disguise, and joined the insurgents. Cevallos, who, in the course of little more than two months, had sworn allegiance to three monarchs, again deserted his colours and enrolled himself as a patriot. These were evil omens. The capital was now open to the armies of Andalusia and Valencia; and it was reported that the former was within a few marches of the city. The Court were terror-stricken. A council of war was immediately assembled; and Savary, by whom Murat had been succeeded in command, proposed to garrison the Retiro, and attack the Spanish armies in succession, as they advanced to Madrid. But



more timid councils prevailed. It was determined to abandon the capital and retreat behind the Ebro.

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Thus, after a short but fierce struggle, had the Spaniards, by their own unaided valour, succeeded in freeing nearly their whole territory from the presence of the invaders. This success had been achieved against the first army of Europe, commanded by the greatest generals of the age. At the commencement of hostilities, we know that the French forces in Spain amounted in number to one hundred and fifty thousand men. These, by the energetic courage of the people, had been driven back and discomfited. Not a foreign bayonet had been drawn in their cause. Whatever honour may attach to so splendid an achievement, must exclusively be given to the Spanish people. It is theirs and theirs only. Let this be the answer to those who accuse the patriots of lukewarmness, in the cause which they so gallantly and perseveringly maintained. In truth, considering the disadvantages under which they laboured, the wonder is, not that they did so little, but that they achieved so much. It was manifestly impossible, that a body of undisciplined levies, miserably armed and

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equipped, without experienced leaders, and deficient in the arms of cavalry and artillery, could successfully contend with the French armies in the field. No sophistry, therefore, can be more gross, than that of those reasoners, who argue that the Spanish people were indifferent to the cause of freedom, because their armies were frequently defeated in the field. The memory of Baylen, Valencia, Zaragoza, Bruch, and Gerona, will bear imperishable record of the national ardour and perseverance, and give the lie to those who would basely injure the cause of freedom, by vilifying the character of its defenders.

Yet, he would judge erroneously of the character of this memorable struggle, who should form an estimate of the amount and vigour of the hostility of the Spanish people, by an exclusive reference to the operations of their armies. These, in truth, formed but a small part of that widely extended system of destructive warfare, by which the French were encountered in the Peninsula. Wherever any detachment of their armies could be overpowered by the peasantry, they were attacked and massacred. All stragglers perished. The motion of large masses was continually required, to keep open the commu-

nication of the different corps, and protect their  
convoys. The expense of life, by which the in-  
vaders were enabled, at any period, to hold mili-  
tary possession of the country, was enormous.  
Throughout the whole contest, there was a spirit  
of fierce and unmitigated hostility abroad, in  
every quarter of the kingdom; an enmity which  
never slumbered nor slept, which was in con-  
tinual and almost universal action, and which  
wasted, like a pestilence, the strength of the  
invaders.

Though the Spaniards owed much of the suc-  
cess which crowned their efforts, to their own  
zeal and courage, it must be confessed, that some  
portion of it is attributable to the blunders of  
their opponents. The French were evidently  
unprepared for the degree and character of the  
resistance which they encountered in the Penin-  
sula. They regarded the people with contempt,  
and were consequently led to attempt important  
objects, with inadequate means. Defeat was  
the penalty of these ignorant miscalculations.  
—Something of gratuitous tarnish, something  
even of dark and memorable disgrace, may have  
been cast on the national arms, by the misconduct  
and timidity of those intrusted with command;

CHAP. IX.

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CHAP. IX. but it is unquestionable, that the disasters, in  
1808. which their operations so often terminated, are  
July. greatly attributable to those who directed the  
conduct of the war. Objects of vast impor-  
tance, which, by an effort of competent magni-  
tude and vigour, might have been secured to  
the invaders, were lost ; and all the moral con-  
sequences of failure were hazarded with an im-  
prudent rashness, of which the subsequent details  
of this narrative will abundantly display the  
results.

## CHAPTER X.

## OPERATIONS IN PORTUGAL.

IN Portugal, the measures of the usurping government were not of a character to conciliate the affections of the people. The invaders had at once thrown off the mask. The ancient dynasty was proclaimed to have forfeited the throne. The pictures of the Braganzan monarchs were torn from the walls of the palace, with circumstances of public indignity. Contributions of inordinate magnitude were exacted from the people. The artifices which had been adopted in Spain, to blind the nation to the real views of the usurper, were considered unnecessary in Portugal. That country was too limited in territory, and too feeble in resources, to excite the fears of Napoleon; and there no attempt was

CHAP. X

1808.

June.

Observador  
Portuguez.

CHAP. X. made to exhibit usurpation in the semblance of justice.

1808.

June.

Foy.

In the eyes of the French government, a people so little formidable, had no claim to mercy or forbearance. "Of what use is it," asked the minister of Napoleon, in a letter to Marshal Junot, "to make promises which you cannot perform. Nothing, undoubtedly, can be more laudable, than to conciliate the confidence and affection of the people; but do not forget that the safety of the army is a paramount object. Disarm the Portuguese; maintain a strict watch over the soldiers, lest they become the nucleus of insurrection. Watch too the Spanish troops. Guard the important fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Lisbon is too large and too populous a city, and the population is necessarily hostile. Withdraw your troops from it. Hut them on the sea coast. Keep them exercised, disciplined, and collected in masses, that they may be always ready to encounter the English army, which, sooner or later, will be landed on the shores of Portugal."

Though the arrogance and the rapacity of their invaders, did not, and could not, fail to excite the indignation and the hatred of the people,



yet several months elapsed, before these feelings gave rise to any general or formidable demonstrations of resistance. Intelligence of the insurrection in Spain, at length set the match to the train, and fired the spirit of the people with a kindred ardour and devotion to the cause of freedom. In vain did Junot endeavour to deceive the people by false information. In vain did he suppress or mutilate the letters by the public post, which gave intelligence of the events passing in the sister country. The news were disseminated through the country by a thousand channels. Secret messengers were employed by the Supreme Junta, to convey to the Spanish army in Portugal, injunctions to join their countrymen in defending the throne and the altar from usurpation and insults. Private letters to the military of all ranks, besought them to return to Spain, and afford protection to their families amid the dangers which surrounded them.

Such appeals were not made in vain. Thenceforward no confidence could be placed in the fidelity of the Spanish army. Junot endeavoured to conciliate them by every means in his power. He treated the higher officers with flattering distinction, and raised the pay and allow-

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

Thiebault.

CHAP. X.

1808.

June.

ances of the troops, to an equality with those of the French army. Every measure was taken to guard against defection. The Spanish army was divided into small bodies, and dispersed over as wide a surface as possible; directions were given to the officers commanding in the neighbourhood, to redouble their vigilance; and preparations were made to repel, by strong measures, the first overt demonstrations of disaffection in the troops.

It was under such circumstances of impending peril, that Junot was compelled, by the order of Napoleon, to weaken his army, by detaching four thousand men under Loison, to co-operate with Bessieres on the Spanish frontier; and an equal number, under General Avril, to assist Dupont in his operations in Andalusia. The army of Junot was thus imprudently weakened, at the very moment when a powerful and general resistance was about to break forth; and the force which remained was barely equal to supply the necessary garrisons, for the more important points of occupation.

But circumstances favoured the French. Avril, having advanced to Tavira, was induced to retrace his steps, by intelligence that an Eng-

lish army was stationed at Ayamonte; and Loison, having failed in his object of occupying Rodrigo, was subsequently recalled to Oporto.

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It was in that city that the chief body of the Spanish army was stationed. On the death of General Taranco, the command had been assumed by General Quesnel, a French officer of prudence and moderation, yet by no means acceptable to the troops. The symptoms of disaffection daily increased. Quesnel, fearing a revolt, prepared the fort of San Joao de Foz, which commands the harbour of Oporto, as a place of refuge for himself, and the weak escort on whose fidelity alone he could rely. His fears were soon realized. General Belesta, the officer next in command, received orders from the Junta of Galicia to return to Spain, and to bear with him as captives all the French remaining at Oporto. These orders were obeyed: Quesnel and his staff were arrested; and Belesta having convoked the native authorities of the province, declared them at liberty to act as they thought proper, and departed for Galicia, with the Spanish army and the prisoners they had secured.

Jun. 6.

On the ninth of June intelligence of these events reached Lisbon. They were naturally

Jun. 9.



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pregnant with alarm. Vigorous and decisive measures were immediately adopted by Junot. Caraffa's division of Spaniards—the only one remaining in the country—composed of six battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and several troops of artillery, was stationed in different villages in the vicinity of Lisbon. These troops, by a skilful and daring stratagem, were disarmed, and, with the exception of a few hundreds who succeeded in effecting their escape, were placed as prisoners on board of vessels in the Tagus.

The boldness and facility of execution with which this success was achieved, struck the hearts of the insurgents with alarm. They again declared their allegiance to the existing government. Junot was little inclined to increase the difficulties of his situation, by adding to the irritation of the people. He accepted their submission; and endeavoured, by a conciliatory proclamation, and by increasing the allowances of the Portuguese army, to secure their adhesion to his cause.

Observador  
Portuguez.

Yet strong measures were taken for disarming the population. Heavy punishment was denounced on the possession of warlike implements,

by any inhabitant, whether foreigner or native; and heads of families were declared responsible for the conduct of all belonging to their establishments. In the numerous quarters where resistance had already appeared, detachments of French troops were stationed, in order at once to punish and overawe the disaffected.

But the flame of hatred and indignation, which had long burned in the bosom of the people, could no longer be suppressed. Insurrection again broke forth in the province of Oporto. On the day of *Corpo de Deos*, the soldiers refused to carry the French eagles in the procession. The appearance of a few Spaniards, who had remained in concealment since the departure of Belestá's division, gave rise to the report that a Spanish army was approaching to liberate the province. An English frigate, cruising off the entrance of the Douro, contributed to spread the belief that a squadron was about to enter the river. The governor, Don Luiz de Oliveira, who had endeavoured to allay the tumult, was deposed from his command and thrown into prison. The gates of the Arsenal were forced, and arms and ammunition distributed among the people. The insurrection continued

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1808.

June.

CHAP. X. hourly to assume a more formidable character.

1808.

June.

On the morning of the nineteenth, the populace hurried in crowds to the Episcopal Palace. The Bishop came forth into the balcony, and gave them his pastoral benediction. He then descended to the street, and, kissing the banners of the country, said to those who bore them, "Let us go and return thanks to God." The flock followed their pastor to the Cathedral Church, where, having implored a blessing on the cause in which they had embarked, a junta of eight members was appointed for the provisional government of the country, of which the Bishop was declared president.

While the standard of liberty was thus raised in the north, another insurrection, nearly simultaneous, took place in Algarve. General Maurin, who commanded in that province, was succeeded, in consequence of illness, by Colonel Maransin, who, with a force of about sixteen hundred men, found himself incapable of restraining the tumultuous hostility of the people. The arrival of a British force at Ayamonte, gave encouragement to the insurgents; while the apprehensions of Maransin were increased, by the report that a Spanish force was about to cross