

the assembly of numerous bodies of troops along the French coast, infused into the people of England a military spirit, of which, for many generations back, they had known nothing; and the minister of the day was far too prudent not to turn it to a right account. Every encouragement was given to the enrolment of corps of volunteers; and these corps of volunteers, as well as the regiments of militia, all served as so many nurseries for the line. Men who had once borne arms, even though they carried them in sport, began to feel their objections to the life of a soldier gradually abate; and many an individual who put on a uniform with no other design than that of protecting the peace of the country, became, before long, a member of the regular army. The victory of Trafalgar, likewise, as it left us no enemies with whom to contend at sea, naturally enough turned the views of the brave and the enterprising to the land service. From all these causes, recruits, both in officers and men, presented themselves as rapidly as the most warlike administration could have desired; insomuch, that on the 1st of January, 1808, there were enrolled under the British standard, of regular infantry, cavalry, and artillery, exclusive of foreign mercenaries, little short of three hundred thousand men.

Of the discipline which pervaded this prodigious mass, it is not necessary to say much; even our enemies—those at least who were our

enemies, and who still entertain towards us a degree of rancorous jealousy for which no good cause can be assigned—allow that the discipline of the British army was, and is superior to that of any other army in Europe. Under the wise and paternal management of the late venerated Commander-in-Chief, a code, stern enough in theory, but mild though firm in practice, had been established. Promotion too, which in former times had proceeded without any regard whatever to the fitness of individuals, was rendered as equitable as it ever can be under a system which admits of advancement by purchase. Boys were no longer permitted to hold commissions, whilst they were yet acquiring the first elements of education; nor was it any more in the power of the minister of the day, to reward the favourite who had proved in any manner useful to himself, by bestowing upon him the command of a regiment. A regular scale was drawn up, in accordance with which no man was permitted to hold an ensign's commission till he had attained the age of sixteen. Three years' service was requisite to qualify him for the rank of captain, seven years for that of major. Nor were other and equally important matters left in the condition in which they once stood. In former times, each colonel or commanding officer of a regiment was in the habit of manœuvring his corps in any way or upon any plan

which to himself might appear most convenient. The consequence was, that in the British army there were almost as many systems of field movement as there were regiments of cavalry and infantry; and, that hardly any two could, when called upon to act together, act to any purpose. This disadvantageous mode of proceeding was abolished. One uniform and consistent system was drawn up for the infantry; another for the cavalry; and all regiments were expected to render themselves perfect in these, before they attempted to learn any thing besides. Such changes, together with the establishment of hospitals for the wounded and disabled soldiers, and for the education of children whose parents had fallen in the defence of their country, could not fail of producing the most beneficial effect upon the *morale* of the British army; which, from being an object of something like abhorrence to its own countrymen, and of contempt to the troops of other nations, rose to command, as well as to deserve, the esteem of the former, and the respect and admiration of the latter.

There were, however, one or two considerations, which, notwithstanding these acknowledged improvements, long continued to keep alive a disinclination on the part of the ministry, to commit the British army on the great field of continental warfare. In the first place it was doubted whe-

ther, among our own generals, there could be found any, capable of opposing the experienced and skilful warriors of France. We had never been accustomed to carry on war upon a large scale, except in India; and in India, it was believed that, for the successful conduct of a campaign, talents of the first order were hardly required. In the next place, it was not considered either prudent or just to push a handful of British troops into the heart of Europe; where, at a distance from the sea, and cut off from all communication with their own country, they might be compromised at any moment, either through the imbecility or treachery of our ally. England, it was imagined, ought not to take part in a continental war, unless she could do so on some point not very remote from her own shores, and covered by an extensive line of coast; because, in spite of the magnitude of her army in the mass, she could never, it was asserted, pretend to bring more than thirty or forty thousand men into the field. These considerations, it is hardly necessary to add, prevented a British army from appearing in the field at Austerlitz and Jena, or taking a share in any of the previous armaments which from time to time rendered Germany the theatre of war. But the latter objection to the employment of our own troops, the mad ambition of the French ruler at length removed; whilst it only required the ex-

perience of a single campaign to demonstrate, that in the former there had never been any solid grounds of reason.

By the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon Buonaparte was left master of the continent of Europe; the greater part being actually in his possession, and the rest entirely under his control. Over the Germanic body he exercised an authority more real and more absolute than had ever been exercised by the most powerful of the emperors. Switzerland submitted to call him her protector, obeyed his edicts, and filled up his ranks with men. Holding France, Flanders, and Italy for himself, he had placed one brother upon the throne of Naples, another upon that of Holland, whilst for a third a kingdom was erected in the heart of Germany, with territories taken indiscriminately from friend and foe. Joachim Murat, the husband of his sister, possessed a principality, with the title of Grand Duke of Berg; Eugene Beauharnois, his wife's son, was married to a princess of the house of Bavaria, and governed Italy as his viceroy; whilst he was prepared, upon the next vacancy, to place his uncle, Cardinal Fesche, upon the papal throne. Not satisfied with thus enriching and loading with honours the members of his own family, he portioned out among his marshals and companions in arms, kingdoms and principalities worn by the sword; and Dukes of Istria,

and Dalmatia, and Ragusa, and Dantzic, were numbered among the new nobility of France. His own reputation moreover, political as well as military, had risen to a height quite unprecedented; for it is not going too far to affirm that the whole civilised world, dazzled by the splendour of his achievements, lay, with the solitary exception of Great Britain, at his feet.

An empire acquired as had been that of Napoleon, can never even for a moment be said to rest upon a sure foundation. One error in politics, one failure in war, may suddenly excite a storm which all the vigour of its chief will not be able to surmount; and of this truth the Emperor of the French was doomed to furnish a memorable example. Nor will it readily cease to afford matter of astonishment to the reflecting mind, that the first and most decisive blow to his power, should have come from a quarter where, above all others, he believed himself, and had just ground to believe himself, the most secure.

When the sovereigns of Europe deemed it expedient to arm for the purpose of opposing the progress of the French Revolution, the courts both of Madrid and Lisbon entered, with apparent cordiality, into the general league. Spain sent an army across the Pyrenees, to which a few battalions of Portuguese attached themselves; whilst Portugal despatched nine sail of the line to follow

the fortunes of the British fleet. The war in the south of France was not conducted either with skill or vigour. For a time indeed, that is to say, as long as the Directory found itself too busy to pay much attention to the state of affairs in that quarter, the allies obtained a few successes, but they in no instance followed them up with the slightest intrepidity; and they had hardly been opposed by moderate forces, when the tide of fortune turned against them. They not only lost the little ground which they had gained, but their beaten columns were pursued across the frontier; Catalonia was overrun, and Madrid itself threatened. An imbecile prince, and no less imbecile favourite, alarmed by the progress which the victorious republicans were making, hastened to put an end to a disastrous war, by a disgraceful peace. It was concluded in 1795, by the treaty of Basle, which, at the distance of a year after, was succeeded by a league offensive and defensive, entered into at St. Ildefonso.

From that moment Spain became, in point of fact, nothing more than a mere appendage to France. The family compact, as it was now absurdly termed, having been renewed with the Directory, it was not to be expected that it would cease to operate when the democratical form of government gave place to the imperial; or that the Emperor of the French would be less ready to avail

himself of it, than had been the rulers of the republic. At the instigation of Buonaparte, Spain declared war against England; and a contest began, which could hardly fail of bringing upon her the heaviest disasters. During its progress, her marine, which Charles III had taken the utmost care to foster, was destroyed; her commerce received a fatal blow; the intercourse with her South American colonies was interrupted, and the way paved for that separation which has since occurred; her finances became every day more and more embarrassed; and public credit sank to the lowest ebb. Her army, likewise, was drafted away to fight the battles of her lordly ally in the most distant parts of Europe; and she was left in a situation as helpless and pitiable as has ever been filled by a nation.

It is hardly necessary to state that, at this period, and for some time previous, Spain was governed by an individual on whose head fortune appeared to have taken delight in showering the richest of her favours. Manuel Godoy, a man of obscure birth, who originally filled no higher station than that of a private in the royal bodyguards, having attracted the notice of the Queen, was by her influence raised to the highest dignities in the state; and came at last to possess an authority more decided than that of the weak master whom he professed to serve. Godoy was, at the

breaking out of the French Revolution, commander-in-chief of the armies, and lord high admiral of the fleets of Spain; and at the close of 1792, he was appointed to the important office which Florida Blanca had filled under Charles III, that of President of the Councils. He it was, who, after conducting the war with so little ability, accepted peace, upon terms which laid Spain at the feet of her neighbour; and he received, as the reward of his services on that occasion, the title of Prince of the Peace. Godoy appears to have been a strange compound of weakness with genius, and of numerous vices, with a few virtues. That he willingly and knowingly betrayed his country, there is no reason for supposing; but like all upstarts, he considered the general good as a matter to be postponed on every occasion to his private benefit; and he unquestionably brought about the downfall of the Spanish monarchy in the vain attempt to uphold his own power. Godoy was not disposed to favour the French, for he both feared and hated their ruler; but, like his sovereign, he feared that extraordinary man more than he hated him, and therefore submitted to receive his yoke. When the peace of Amiens was broken, Napoleon, in virtue of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, called upon Spain to join him with her fleets and armies; but Godoy was desirous of evading the request; and he even succeeded, for a short time,

in purchasing an insecure neutrality, by the payment of forty thousand pounds per month into the imperial treasury. At last, however, Spain was hurried into the war, which brought so many and such severe calamities upon her; from the effects of which she has not yet recovered, and probably never will recover.

Whilst Spain was thus acting the part of a province of France, Portugal, faithful to the terms of her ancient alliance with England, continued to maintain a hostile attitude towards the common enemy. Not that she acted thus either willingly or confidently. Deprived by the treaty of St. Ildefonso of a barrier against French invasion, upon which she had been accustomed to count, Portugal could not but feel that, in striving, even with the aid of England, to assert her independence, she was attempting that which neither the condition of her defences, nor the numerical strength of her population, authorised her to attempt. But she was well aware that no peace would be granted to her on any other terms besides the shutting of her ports against English vessels; and she felt that a rupture with England must speedily reduce her to the lowest extremities of distress. Under these circumstances, the court of Lisbon issued orders for the enrolment of large bodies of troops. The arsenals were filled with warlike instruments; the forts and towns on the frontier were

put in a state of repair; and the *ordinances*, or levies *en masse*, received instructions to repair, each company to its accustomed place of rendezvous, on the first alarm of an enemy.

It is not necessary to detail at length the particulars of the war which ensued. For a time no event occurred of greater importance than the occasional capture of a Portuguese merchant-man by one of the French privateers, which, in great numbers, found shelter in the ports of Spain. An invasion was indeed threatened; Buonaparte, when in Egypt, declared to his troops, that "a time would come, when the Portuguese nation should pay with tears of blood for the insult which it had offered to the republic," by despatching a squadron to act in conjunction with the British fleet in the Mediterranean. But the continental war which broke out in 1799, delayed the execution of that threat; nor was it till 1801, that any serious movements were made for carrying it into effect. Then, however, the fate of Germany being decided, and peace dictated to the rest of Europe, the First Consul began seriously to turn his attention towards the accomplishment of his prophecy; under the persuasion that, in detaching Portugal from England, he would be striking a blow at the power of the latter empire, in what he was pleased to term the most accessible part of her dominions.

A convention was accordingly entered into at Madrid, between the French republic and his Catholic Majesty, which had for its object the forcible deliverance of Portugal from the alliance of England. It was followed, on the 27th of February, by a declaration of war by Spain, for the prosecution of which her troops were already in motion; whilst a French corps of fifteen thousand men passed the Pyrenees, and took up its quarters in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo, for the purpose of supporting the Spanish army, to which the task of invading Portugal was assigned.

To oppose this attack, the Duke de Lafoes, prime minister of Portugal, occupied both sides of the Tagus with a corps of thirty thousand men. They were miserably armed, wretchedly equipped, and neither paid nor fed; and the only British force at hand to support them, consisted of a brigade of foreign regiments, a detachment of the 20th light dragoons, and a few cannon, under General Fraser. The campaign was, as might be expected, unfavourable to the Portuguese, though by neither side was much activity or talent displayed; and before the middle of June, peace was signed between Portugal and Spain, at Badajoz. But with the terms of that peace, though they included the shutting of the Portuguese ports against all intercourse with England, the First Consul was not satisfied; nor was it till the 29th of the

following September that the court of Lisbon succeeded in obtaining his approbation of the treaty. To secure this, Portugal was content to pay one million sterling to the French government; besides consenting to other arrangements, both commercial and territorial, all of them in the highest degree prejudicial to her own interests.

The peace of Amiens suspended for a while the operation of that article in the treaty which closed the ports of Lisbon and Oporto against English merchandise, and the old commercial intercourse between the two nations was renewed; but the rupture, which so soon followed, again placed Portugal in a difficult situation. At first, Buonaparte insisted upon the necessity of recurring to the prohibitory system, and appeared bent upon allowing no modification of its operations; but a variety of considerations led him at last to change his tone. The war in which Spain by his dictation had engaged, unavoidably produced an interruption in the arrival of those treasures from South America which he found so useful to himself in the prosecution of his schemes of conquest: it was necessary that some harbour should be left open for their reception. On this account, and on condition of securing, during the continuance of the maritime war, a monthly tribute of forty or fifty thousand pounds, Buonaparte consented that Portugal should continue to main-

tain a friendly intercourse with Great Britain ; and she became, in consequence, the only neutral state in the south of Europe.

In this condition both Spain and Portugal remained, from 1803 up to 1807 ; the one suffering all the misery attendant upon a compulsory alliance with a power which exhausted her revenues, and ruined her commerce ; the other writhing under the pain of a heavy contribution, and exposed every day to fresh vexations, which she possessed not the means of resisting. Nor were the internal affairs of either kingdom in a more prosperous state than their external connexions. In Spain, the nobility were sunk to the lowest pitch of degradation ; the clergy, avaricious and domineering, ruled the people with a rod of iron ; and the King was not ashamed to appear as a tool in the hands of the very man, who, to all appearance, was living in a state of adultery with his wife. Every department of the state was mismanaged. The towns, deserted by their inhabitants, presented a melancholy picture of what a nation must come to, whose rulers are possessed neither of energy of mind nor honesty of character ; and the very fields were in many places left uncultivated, for want of sufficient hands to till them. In like manner, the Spanish army, which, under the Emperors Charles V and Philip, had been the admiration of Europe, was now a thing of no name,—a very 74

by-word of derision and contempt to the troops of other nations. The few soldiers that remained in the country were without pay, or clothing, or even arms; the officers, taken from the lowest classes, were not ashamed to wait, as servants, in their uniforms, behind the chairs of the grandees. All the arsenals were empty. There were not provisions or stores of any kind, in any of the fortresses, sufficient for a month's consumption of the wretched garrisons which held them; and the very foundries had ceased to work, except at remote intervals.

Yet was the spirit of Spain far from being wholly broken. Driven from the higher and prouder circles, it took refuge among the peasantry; nor would it be easy to point out, in any quarter of the world, a nobler or finer race of men than those who cultivated the vine on the banks of the Ebro, or led their long lines of mules from one quarter of the kingdom to another. These men had partaken in no degree of the degeneracy of their superiors. The memory of their country's former greatness was kept alive in them by those traditionary ballads which Spaniards, more than the inhabitants of any other European state, delight in repeating; and they never failed to contrast it with the humiliating attitude which the imbecility of their present government condemned them to assume. Had there been in Charles sufficient firmness to desire

an emancipation from foreign thralldom, he might have roused, in one day, the whole male population of Spain about him. But there was no such firmness in that weak monarch. The dupe of Godoy on the one hand, and of his own fears on the other, he continued to hug the chain which bound him, as long as it was possible so to do; nor, when that chain was burst at last, did the smallest credit attach either to him or to his worthless minister.

In Portugal, the same, or nearly the same, order of things prevailed. The Regent, a weak and superstitious prince, was not, indeed, like his father-in-law, under the influence of a favourite minister, but he was as completely the slave of his confessor, as Charles was the slave of Godoy. As long as it was permitted him to attend religious processions; as long as the church seemed to flourish in its primitive grandeur; he cared not how other departments of his kingdom were guided, or in what plight his people dragged on existence. Nor were the nobles who surrounded him more patriotic or more respectable than those who surrounded the throne of Spain. In Portugal, as in the neighbouring country, all that had ever been admirable in the national character could be found only among the peasantry; who, in spite of the corrupting influence of their superiors, continued to the last a high-spirited, brave, and obedient race.

It has been said that Godoy cannot with truth be accused of submitting wilfully and knowingly to the yoke which France had placed upon the neck of his country. Like the mass of the people, he writhed painfully under it; and as it afterwards appeared, nothing but an overwhelming dread of the consequences had deterred him from making a vigorous attempt to cast it off. At last, however, the general feeling on that subject became so strong, that he determined to do something for the purpose of indulging it. The plan which he devised, and the method which he pursued in maturing it, are already well known to the public; but since to these the whole series of events which followed may be traced back, as to their immediate causes, it may not be amiss to offer here a brief recapitulation of the leading circumstances which attended them.

The overthrow of the Bourbon dynasty in Naples had sensibly alarmed the court of Madrid; and the prospect of that rupture with Prussia which ended in the peace of Tilsit, struck Godoy as furnishing a favourable opportunity of stirring up all Europe against a man whose ambition seemed to be without bounds. A secret arrangement was accordingly entered into between him and the ambassador Strogonoff, into which the Portuguese Envoy was admitted, that the two kingdoms of Spain and Portugal should instantly arm, for the

purpose of attacking France at a moment when her troops should be called away to oppose the Emperor of Russia in the north. These preparations were to begin in Portugal; with the ostensible view of overawing which, Spain was next to increase her armies; whilst expeditions being fitted out in the English ports, a combined force was to invade the south of France, which, it was believed, would not be in a fit state to offer any efficient opposition. Such were the plans of Godoy, in proposing which so much secrecy was preserved, that no other agent of the government either at home or abroad was made acquainted with what was pending; but they were destined never to be carried into effect. Before a single step had been taken either in Spain or Portugal; before any direct communication had been opened with England, there suddenly appeared a proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, calling upon all good Spaniards to arm, and to assist in delivering their country from the perils which menaced it. This proclamation was given to the world at a time when Buonaparte was absent on the Prussian campaign; and its tenor was such as no person could possibly misunderstand. It produced a very powerful effect; but the effect was directly the reverse in kind from that which it was intended to produce.

Baron Strogonoff and the Portuguese Ambassa-

dor, equally startled at the great imprudence of the step which had been taken, lost no time in disavowing all participation in a project which they now equally pretended to condemn. So fearful, indeed, was the court of Lisbon of being supposed to be a partner in the conspiracy, that it compelled Earl St. Vincent to withdraw, with his fleet, from the Tagus. Godoy instantly saw the folly of the act into which his natural precipitancy had hurried him. He hastened to offer such explanations to the French Ambassador as he judged most likely to allay the anger of Napoleon, and he instructed his private agent, Don Eugenio Izquierdo, to make the most abject submissions in his name to Napoleon in person. Paragraphs likewise appeared in the Madrid newspapers, some of them ascribing late events to an apprehension of an invasion by the Emperor of Morocco; others offering rewards for the detection of the miscreant who had forged a circular letter to the intendants of provinces in the name of the Prince of the Peace; whilst the motives of the proclamation, of which the authenticity could not be denied, were industriously pronounced to be a sense of duty towards France, and an over-anxiety to oppose the projects of England.

Buonaparte received the documents above alluded to subsequent to the battle of Jena; and he read in the palace of the King of Prussia a corres-

pondence which placed the intended revolt of Spain beyond a doubt. He vowed at the moment to take revenge, but it suited his policy to utter the vow in secret; and he affected to have cordially forgiven the fault into which his ally, the King of Spain, had been drawn. It is now, however, perfectly ascertained that this disclosure of the feelings of the Peninsular nations towards him, opened his eyes fully to the danger to which his power must always be exposed whilst these nations continued to be governed by their present royal families. He determined, on the instant, that the houses both of Bourbon and Braganza should cease to reign, and that their places should be supplied by those upon whose subserviency to his own views and wishes he might have better reason to depend.

Had Buonaparte, as soon as the designs of Spain became known to him, directed his victorious legions upon Madrid, the dethronement of Charles would have been viewed by the rest of Europe as an arrangement dictated by self-defence; whilst it is not improbable that the war never would have assumed the character which his future proceedings gave to it. But it was not in the nature of the French Emperor to act, in any case, either with openness or candour. Though a passionate lover of war, he never effected that by force of arms, which he believed it practicable to effect by

diplomacy; and the principle which guided him in other cases failed not to operate here. There were, however, other reasons for the system which he pursued, and these deserve to be recorded.

There are few states in which the favourite of the reigning monarch becomes not, sooner or later, an object of hatred to the heir apparent, and, as a necessary consequence, to all who are disposed to worship the rising sun rather than the sun in its meridian. This was peculiarly the case at the court of Madrid. Godoy was, and had long been, at variance with Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias; and so bitter was the feeling of animosity which subsisted between them, that the bare adoption by Godoy of one line of policy, was sufficient to guide Ferdinand to the adoption of its opposite. As soon, therefore, as Godoy's hostility to the French became known, Ferdinand made haste to declare himself a supporter of the French interests. He even went so far as to address a private letter to Napoleon, in which he entreated him to deliver his father and mother from the influence of an artful favourite; to free Spain from the thralldom of an upstart; and to honour himself by granting him an alliance with a princess of the imperial blood. Whether Buonaparte ever entertained any serious intention of complying with these requests, it were difficult to determine; but this much is known, that he answered Ferdinand's letter kindly, and

that he readily consented to become the arbiter in the disputes which divided the royal family of Spain. How his arbitration was conducted, Spain and Europe will not soon cease to remember.

In the mean while however, under the pretext of standing in need of their services, Buonaparte required that a corps of sixteen thousand Spaniards under Romana should proceed to join his armies on the shores of the Baltic. To these were added a division of six thousand men, which, with General O'Farrel at their head, had previously served in Tuscany; and thus almost all the regular troops on which the government could depend, were removed to so great a distance from Spain as to be perfectly useless. But Napoleon's duplicity ended not here. At the very moment when he was giving Ferdinand assurances of his regard and protection, he induced the weak Charles to heap upon Godoy an additional load of favours, till both the king and his favourite became intoxicated, the one with joy, the other with vanity. By this means, by appearing to each party inclined to countenance it in its projects and wishes, he not only kept alive, but widened the breach which already existed within the court of Madrid, and put matters in a train for that issue which, in all probability, he had already determined to bring about.

The peace of Tilsit having restored him victorious to his capital, Buonaparte began to make im-

mediate preparations to support a war of diplomacy by one of violence. Without any reasonable excuse having been assigned for the measure, a corps of twenty-five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry was seen to assemble in the month of August, 1807, at the base of the Pyrenees, which assumed the somewhat enigmatical appellation of the Corps of Observation of the Gironde. Whilst this force was organising itself under the directions of Marshal Junot, the Spanish minister at Paris was entering into a secret treaty; the object of which was nothing less than the erasure of Portugal from the list of nations. By the terms of that treaty, since become illustrious as the "secret treaty of Fontainebleau," it was agreed that Junot's army should enter Portugal at once, aided by three divisions of Spanish troops; that a second army, of forty thousand French soldiers, should assemble in Gascony, ready to support the first, should it meet with any serious opposition; and that Portugal, being subdued, should be divided into three parts, of which the following distribution was to be made. The province of Entre Minho e Douro, with the city of Oporto as its capital, was to be erected into a kingdom, under the title of Northern Lusitania, and given to the King of Etruria, in exchange for his Italian possessions, which he ceded in full and entire sovereignty to Buonaparte. In like manner, Alentejo

and Algarve were to be given to Godoy, who was to assume the style and title of Prince of the Algarves; and the remaining Portuguese provinces were to be held by Napoleon himself, till a general pacification should enable him to restore them to the house of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and the other Spanish colonies which the English had conquered. These three sovereignties were, however, to be held by investiture from the King of Spain; and their princes were to owe to him the same sort of obedience which, in the feudal times, the holder of a fief owed to his sovereign lord. The colonial possessions of Portugal, again, were to be equally divided between the crowns of France and Spain; and the Emperor of the French was, as soon as it should be convenient, to acknowledge his Catholic Majesty as emperor of the two Americas.

Though nothing officially transpired indicative of the object which the army of observation was intended to effect, Europe was not so short-sighted as to remain for one instant in doubt as to the ultimate field of its operations. In the first place, the officer who was placed at its head had long filled, and still continued in name at least to fill, the station of ambassador at the court of Lisbon from the imperial cabinet. It is true that, on the opening of the Austrian campaign, Junot had quitted the seat of his diplomatic duties, that he might exe-

cute the more congenial offices which devolved upon him as aide-de-camp to the Emperor; but he had done so by the express permission of his master; and instead of his place being supplied by another commissioned representative, the business of the mission was intrusted, as in the case of other temporary absences of the principal, to the chief secretary, M. de Rayneval. This circumstance was of itself sufficient to create a suspicion that something prejudicial to the interests of Portugal was intended; and if there were any who at first appeared willing to doubt on the subject, their doubts were not permitted long to exist. The treaty of Fontainebleau was hardly signed, when the ministers, both of France and Spain, presented a strong remonstrance to the Prince Regent, requiring that the Berlin and Milan decrees should be strictly enforced at every harbour of Portugal; and it was further required, on threat of the immediate commencement of hostilities, that all the British subjects then resident in the kingdom should be seized, and all the British property confiscated.

The conduct of the Regent of Portugal under circumstances so trying, was not very different from that which might have been expected at his hands. He dared not refuse obedience to the first mandate, and he remonstrated against the second only in the mildest and most submissive terms.

But the powers with whom he had to deal entertained no wish that he should pay to their remonstrances a prompt attention; they were pleased, rather than the reverse, at every appearance of dissatisfaction which he happened to exhibit. Finding that "his sense of religion, and the regard which he had for existing treaties," would not permit him at once to commit so flagrant an act of injustice, the French and Spanish ministers demanded their passports; and before either these could be given, or the unhappy Prince was enabled to appeal through his own ambassadors to the generosity of his neighbours, the troops destined to overrun Portugal were in motion.

CHAPTER II.

March of Junot's army across the frontier—It arrives at Salamanca, passes Alcantara, and enters Portugal—Its sufferings by the way—Alarm of the court of Lisbon—Proposal to emigrate to Brazil warmly supported by Lord Strangford and Sir Sydney Smith—The court gives its consent, appoints a regency, and embarks—Junot reaches Lisbon—His measures for the preservation of public tranquillity—His behaviour, at first conciliating, but afterwards tyrannical—The tri-coloured flag hoisted—The regency abolished—Junot assumes supreme power—The Portuguese army disbanded, and a heavy fine imposed upon the people—General discontent of all classes—Numerous broils and arbitrary punishments—The Spanish troops exhibit symptoms of disaffection—Exertions of Junot to prevent a rebellion, and to secure himself against the English.

THE treaty of Fontainbleau was not yet signed, when on the 17th of October, 1807, Junot received orders to put his troops in motion within twenty-four hours. At daybreak on the 18th the first division of the army of observation of the Gironde crossed the Bidassoa; it was followed on the 19th

by the second ; and the whole army, marching in six columns, each at the interval of one day from that which had preceded it, entered Spain. About the same time, three corps of Spanish troops began to take the road towards Portugal, by different routes. One of these, which was appointed to act under the immediate orders of the French Marshal, was directed to assemble at Alcantara, on the Tagus. It consisted of eight battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, one troop of horse artillery, and two companies of sappers and miners ; and it was commanded by Don Juan Carraffa, captain-general of the province of Estremadura. Another, destined to act by itself, for the occupation of Northern Lusitania, mustered fourteen battalions, six squadrons, and one company of foot artillery, and was placed under the direction of Don Francisco Taranco y Plano, captain-general of Galicia : its point of rendezvous was Tuy, on the borders of Minho. A third, at the head of which was Don Francisco Solano, marquis del Socorro, and captain-general of Andalusia, was composed of eight battalions, five squadrons, and a troop of horse artillery, and received instructions to collect in the vicinity of Badajoz. In order to complete these corps, it is scarcely necessary to state that every disposable soldier in the Spanish army was put in requisition ; that even the King's body-guard furnished its quota ; and