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
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HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK I.

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### INTRODUCTION.

THE hostility of the European aristocracy caused the enthusiasm of republican France to take a military direction, and forced that powerful nation into a course of policy which, however outrageous it might appear, was in reality one of necessity. Up to the treaty of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive,—for the bloody contest that wasted the continent so many years was not a struggle for pre-eminence between ambitious powers, not a dispute for some accession of territory, nor for the political ascendancy of one or other nation, but a deadly conflict to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate, whether equality or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European governments.

The French Revolution was pushed into existence before the hour of its natural birth. The power of the aristocratic principle was too vigorous, and too much identified with that of the monarchical principle, to be successfully resisted by a virtuous democratic effort, much less could it be overthrown by a democracy rioting in innocent blood, and menacing destruction to political and religious establishments the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed, indeed, yet scarcely showing their gray hairs. The first military events of the Revolution, the disaffection of Toulon and Lyons, the civil war of La Vendée, the feeble, although successful resistance made

to the Duke of Brunswick's invasion, and the frequent and violent change of rulers whose fall none regretted, were all proofs that the French Revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain the physical and moral force pressing it down, was fast sinking, when the wonderful genius of Napoleon, baffling all reasonable calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only one capable of supporting the crude production.

Nevertheless that great man knew the cause he upheld was not sufficiently in unison with the feelings of the age, and his first care was to disarm, or neutralize, monarchical and sacerdotal enmity, by restoring a church establishment, and by becoming a monarch himself. Once a sovereign, his vigorous character, his pursuits, his talents, and the critical nature of the times, inevitably rendered him a despotic one; yet while he sacrificed political liberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care equality, a sensible good that produces increasing satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society. But this, the real principle of his government and secret of his popularity, made him the people's monarch, not the sovereign of the aristocracy, and hence Mr. Pitt called him "The child and the champion of democracy," a truth as evident as that Mr. Pitt and his successors were the children and the champions of aristocracy; hence, also, the privileged classes of Europe consistently transferred their natural and implacable hatred of the French Revolution to his person,—for they saw that in him innovation had found a protector, that he alone having given pre-eminence to a system so hateful to them, was really what he called himself, "The State."

The treaty of Tilsit, therefore, although it placed Napoleon in a commanding situation with regard to the potentates of Europe, unmasked the real nature of the war, and brought him and England, the respective champions of equality and privilege, into more direct contact; peace could not be between them while both were strong, and all that the French Emperor had hitherto gained only enabled him to choose his future field of battle.

When the catastrophe of Trafalgar forbade him to think of invading England, his fertile genius had conceived the plan of sapping her naval and commercial strength by depriving her of the markets for her manufactured goods—that is, he prohibited the reception of English wares in any part of the continent, and exacted from allies and dependants the most rigid compliance with his orders; but this "continental system," as it was called, became inoperative when French troops were not present to enforce his commands. It was thus in Portugal, where British influence was

really paramount, although the terror inspired by the French arms seemed at times to render it doubtful. Fear is, however, momentary, while self-interest is lasting, and Portugal was but an unguarded province of England; from thence, and from Gibraltar, English goods freely passed into Spain. To check this traffic by force was not easy, and otherwise impossible.

Spain stood nearly in the same position with regard to France that Portugal did to England: a warm feeling of friendship for the enemy of Great Britain\* was the natural consequence of the unjust seizure of the Spanish frigates in a time of peace. But although this rendered the French cause popular in Spain, and the court of Madrid was from weakness subservient to the French Emperor, nothing could induce the people to refrain from a profitable contraband trade; they would not pay that respect to the wishes of a foreign power which they refused to the regulations of their own government. Neither was the aristocratical enmity to Napoleon asleep in Spain. A proclamation issued by the Prince of Peace previous to the battle of Jena, although hastily recalled when the result of that conflict was known, sufficiently indicated the tenure upon which the friendship of the Spanish court was held.

This state of affairs drew the French Emperor's attention towards the Peninsula, and a chain of remarkable circumstances, which fixed it there, induced him to remove the reigning family and place his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain.† He thought that the people of that country, sick of an effete government, would be quiescent under such a change; and although it should prove otherwise, the confidence he reposed in his own fortune, unrivalled talents, and vast power, made him disregard the consequences, while the cravings of his military and political system, the danger to be apprehended from the vicinity of a Bourbon dynasty, and above all the temptations offered by a miraculous folly which outran even his desires, urged him to a deed that, well accepted by the people of the Peninsula, would have proved beneficial, but, being enforced contrary to their wishes, was unhallowed either by justice or benevolence.

In an evil hour for his own greatness and the happiness of others, he commenced this fatal project. Founded in violence and executed with fraud, it spread desolation through the fairest portions of the Peninsula, was calamitous to France, destructive to himself, and the conflict between his hardy veterans and the vindictive race he insulted assumed a character of unmitigated ferocity disgraceful to human nature,—for the Spaniards did not fail to defend their

\* Monsieur de Champagny's Report, 21st Oct., 1807.

† Napoleon in Las Casas, Vol. II. 4th part.

just cause with hereditary cruelty, while the French army struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions. Napoleon observed with surprise the unexpected energy of the people, and therefore bent his whole force to the attainment of his object, while England, coming to the assistance of the Peninsula, employed all her resources to frustrate his efforts. Thus the two leading nations of the world were brought into contact, at a moment when both were disturbed by angry passions, eager for great events, and possessed of surprising power.

The extent and population of the French Empire, including the Kingdom of Italy, the Confederation of the Rhine, the Swiss Cantons, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the dependent states of Holland and Naples, enabled Bonaparte, through the medium of the conscription, to array an army in number nearly equal to the great host that followed the Persian of old against Greece. Like that multitude, also, his troops were gathered from many nations, but they were trained in a Roman discipline, and ruled by a Carthaginian genius. Count Mathieu Dumas, in a work that, with unrivalled simplicity and elegance, tells the military story of the world for ten years, has shown how vigorous and well-contrived was the organization of Napoleon's army; the French officers, accustomed to victory, were as bold and enterprising as the troops they led were hardy and resolute, and to this power on land the Emperor joined a formidable marine.\* The ships of France were, indeed, chained in her harbors, but her naval strength was only rebuked, not destroyed. Inexhaustible resources for building, vast establishments, a coast line of many thousand miles, and, above all, the creative genius of Napoleon, were fast nursing up a navy, the efficiency of which the war then impending between Great Britain and the United States promised to aid.† Maritime commerce was certainly fainting in France,‡ but her internal and continental traffic was robust, her manufactures were rapidly improving, her debt small, her financial operations conducted on a prudent plan and with exact economy, the supplies were all raised within the year, without any great pressure from taxation, and from a sound metallic currency.§ Thus there seemed no reason to think that Napoleon could fail of bringing any war to a favorable termination. By a happy combination of vigor and flattery, of order, discipline, and moral excitement, admirably adapted to the genius of his people, he had created a power which appeared resistless, and in truth

\* *Exposé de l'Empire*, 1807-8-9-13.

† *Napoleon's Memoirs*, Las Casas, 7th part. Lord Collingwood's letters

‡ *Exposé* 1808-9. Napoleon, in Las Casas, vol. ii. 4th part.

§ *Ibid.* 6th part.



would have been so if applied to only one great object at a time ; but this the ambition of the man, or rather the force of circumstances, did not permit.

On the other hand, England, omnipotent at sea, was little regarded as a military power. Her enormous debt was yearly increasing in an accelerated ratio, and this necessary consequence of anticipating the resources of the country and dealing in a factitious currency, was fast eating into the vital strength of the state : for although the merchants and great manufacturers were thriving from the accidental circumstances of the times, the laborers were suffering and degenerating in character ; pauperism, and its sure attendant, crime, were spreading over the land, and the population was fast splitting into distinct classes,—the one rich and arbitrary, the other poor and discontented ; the former composed of those who profited, the latter of those who suffered by the war. Of Ireland it is unnecessary to speak ; her wrongs and her misery, peculiar and unparalleled, are too well known, and too little regarded, to call for remark.

This general comparative statement, so favorable to France, would, however, be a false criterion of the relative strength of the belligerents with regard to the approaching struggle in the Peninsula. A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight upon the operations of a general ; it reconciles men to desertion—it sanctifies want of zeal, and is a pretext for cowardice—it renders hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, and glory less satisfactory to the mind of the soldier. Now, the invasion of the Peninsula, whatever might have been its real origin, was an act of violence on the part of Napoleon repugnant to the feelings of mankind : the French armies were burdened with a sense of its iniquity, the British troops exhilarated by a contrary sentiment. All the continental nations had smarted under the sword of Napoleon, but, with the exception of Prussia, none were crushed ; a common feeling of humiliation, the hope of revenge, and the ready subsidies of England, were bonds of union among their governments stronger than the most solemn treaties. France could only calculate on their fears, England was secure in their self-love.

The hatred to what were called French principles was at this period in full activity. The privileged classes of every country hated Napoleon, because his genius had given stability to the institutions that grew out of the revolution, because his victories had baffled their calculations and shaken their hold of power. As the chief of revolutionary France, he was constrained to continue his career until the final accomplishment of her destiny,—and this necessity, overlooked by the great bulk of mankind, afforded plausible

ground for imputing insatiable ambition to the French government and to the French nation, of which ample use was made. Rapacity, insolence, injustice, cruelty, even cowardice, were said to be inseparable from the character of a Frenchman; and, as if such vices were nowhere else to be found, it was more than insinuated that all the enemies of France were inherently virtuous and disinterested. Unhappily, history is but a record of crimes, and it is not wonderful that the arrogance of men, buoyed up by a spring-tide of military glory, should, as well among allies as among vanquished enemies, have produced sufficient disgust to insure a ready belief of any accusation, however false and absurd.

Napoleon was the contriver and the sole support of a political system that required time and victory to consolidate; he was the connecting link between the new interests of mankind, and what of the old were left in a state of vigor; he held them together strongly, but he was no favorite with either, and consequently in danger from both; his power, unsanctified by time, depended not less upon delicate management than upon vigorous exercise; he had to fix the foundations of, as well as to defend, an empire, and he may be said to have been rather peremptory than despotic; there were points of administration with which he durst not meddle even wisely, much less arbitrarily. Customs, prejudices, and the dregs of the revolutionary license interfered to render his policy complicated and difficult, but it was not so with his inveterate adversaries. The delusion of parliamentary representation enabled the English government safely to exercise an unlimited power over the persons and property of the nation, and, through the influence of an active and corrupt press, it exercised nearly the same power over the public mind. The commerce of England, penetrating, as it were, into every house on the face of the globe, supplied a thousand sources of intelligence; the spirit of traffic, which seldom acknowledges the ties of country, was universally on the side of Great Britain, and those twin curses, paper money and public credit—so truly described as “strength in the beginning, but weakness in the end”—were recklessly used by statesmen, whose policy regarded not the interests of posterity. Such were the adventitious causes of England’s power, and her natural, legitimate resources were many and great. If any credit is to be given to the census, the increasing population of the United Kingdom amounted at this period to nearly twenty millions, and France reckoned but twenty-seven millions when Frederick the Great declared that, if he were her king, “not a gun should be fired in Europe without his leave.”

The French army was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers, discipline, skill, and bravery; but contrary to the general

opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force will suffer. Amongst the latter, military crimes may be punished, but moral crimes can hardly be repressed; men will submit to death for a breach of great regulations which they know by experience to be useful, but the constant restraint of petty, though wholesome rules, they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches not to them, but to the nation under whose colors they serve. Great indeed is that genius that can keep men of different nations firm to their colors, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same time. Napoleon's military system was, from this cause, inferior to the British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of the other; yet, before the campaign of the Peninsula had proved its excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly under-rated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given to the French, but the individual soldier was most falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical.

The English are a people very subject to receive, and to cherish false impressions; proud of their credulity as if it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt for the British soldiery had been long entertained, before the ill-success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced, and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by the Duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, was in 1808 scorned as a military power, when she possessed, without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive fortresses, at least two hundred thousand of the best equipped and best disciplined soldiers in the universe,\* together with an immense recruiting establishment; and, through the medium of the militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit. It is true that of this number many were necessarily employed in the defence of the colonies, but enough remained to compose a disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the battle of

\* See Abstract of the military force of Great Britain in 1808

Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered Italy. In all the materials of war the superior ingenuity and skill of the English mechanics were visible, and that intellectual power which distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations in science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in the hour of danger.

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## CHAPTER II.

Dissensions in the Spanish court—Secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau—Junot's army enters Spain—Dupont's and Monecy's corps enter Spain—Duhesme's corps enters Catalonia—Insurrection of Aranjuez and Madrid—Charles the Fourth abdicates—Ferdinand proclaimed King—Murat marches to Madrid—Refuses to recognize Ferdinand as King—The sword of Francis the First delivered to the French General—Savary arrives at Madrid—Ferdinand goes to Bayonne—The fortresses of St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna, and Barcelona, treacherously seized by the French—Riot at Toledo 23d of April, Tumult at Madrid 2d May—Charles the Fourth abdicates a second time in favor of Napoleon—Assembly of the Notables at Bayonne—Joseph Bonaparte declared King of Spain—Arrives at Madrid.

FOR many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain were distracted with domestic quarrels; the son's hand was against his mother, the father's against his son, and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they espoused. Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues of his sister-in-law, the Queen of the Two Sicilies;\* he himself, a weak and inefficient old man, was governed by his wife, and she again by Don Manuel Godoy,† of whose person, it is said, she was enamored even to folly. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the royal guards, this person had been raised to the highest dignities, and the title of Prince of the Peace was conferred upon him whose name must be for ever connected with one of the bloodiest wars that fill the page of history.

Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, hated this favorite, and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth, and apparently forlorn condition, created such an interest in his favor, that the people partook of his feelings; thus the disunion of the royal family, extending its effects beyond the precincts of the court, involved the nation in ruin. Those who know how Spaniards hate

\* Nellerto. The Anagram of Llorente.

† Vide Doblado's Letters.

will comprehend why Godoy, who, though sensual, was a mild, good-natured man, has been so overloaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had been the cause of the disasters in Spain. It was not so. The canon, Escoiquiz, a subtle politician, who appears to have been the chief of Ferdinand's party,\* finding the influence of the Prince of the Peace too strong, looked for support in a powerful quarter, and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the 11th of October, 1807, to the Emperor Napoleon.† In this letter he complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over his father, prayed for the interference of the "hero destined by Providence," so ran the text, "to save Europe and to support thrones;" asked an alliance by marriage with the Bonaparte family, and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect. He received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and upon the 29th of October, Charles denounced him to the Emperor as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination of his own mother. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for interfering in the domestic policy of Spain,—and thus the honor and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy, by the squabbles of two of the most worthless persons.

Some short time before this, Godoy, either instigated by an ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the King would expose him to the vengeance of Ferdinand, had made proposals to the French court to concert a plan for the conquest and division of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condition that a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. Such is the turn given by Napoleon to this affair. But the article which provided an indemnification for the King of Etruria, a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian dominions to France, renders it doubtful if the first offer came from Godoy, and Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose it. The advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his troops; the dispute between the father and the son, now referred to his arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree.

A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fontainebleau, between Marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquierdo on the part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependent on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on

\* Napoleon in Las Casas.

† Nellerto.

the 29th of October, the contracting parties agreeing on the following conditions :

The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portugal, and that kingdom divided into three portions. The province of Entre Minho e Duero, including the town of Oporto, to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania, and given as an indemnification to the dispossessed sovereign of Etruria.

The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for Godoy, who, taking the title of Prince of the Algarves, was still to be in some respects dependent upon the Spanish crown.

The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Trás os Montes, together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit until a general peace, and then to be exchanged under certain conditions for English conquests.

The ultramarine dominions of the exiled family to be equally divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at the longest, the King of Spain to be gratified with the title of Emperor of the two Americas. Thus much for the treaty. The terms of the convention were :

France to employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain 24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry.

The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish cavalry, artillery, and one third of the infantry, and from thence to march to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry, 10,000 were to take possession of the Entre Minho e Duero and Oporto, and 6,000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assembled at Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if England should interfere, or the Portuguese people resist.

If the King of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the chief command to be vested in the person so joining, but, with that exception, the French general to be obeyed whenever the armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march through Spain, the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, and paid by their own government.

The revenues of the conquered provinces to be administered by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the nation in whose name the province was held.

Although it is evident that this treaty and convention favored Napoleon's ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country without creating much suspicion, it does not follow, as some authors have asserted, that they were contrived by the Emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish royal family odious to the



world, and by this far-fetched expedient, to prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate, when he should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to his associate, that they had accorded to the family of Braganza. To say nothing of the weakness of such a policy, founded, as it must be, on the error that governments acknowledge the dictates of justice at the expense of their supposed interests, it must be observed that Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History does not speak of the time when the inhabitants of that country were deficient in spirit; the natural obstacles to an invasion had more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier, could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the facility with which England could, and the probability that she would, succor her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion is, that Napoleon's first intentions were in accordance with the literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, his subsequent proceedings being the result of new projects, conceived as the wondrous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest.\* Again, the convention provided for the organization of a large Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portugal, that is, in precisely the two places from whence they could most readily march to the assistance of their country, if it was invaded. In fact the division of the Marquis of Solano in the south, and that of General Taranco in the north of Portugal, did, when the Spanish insurrection broke out, (Nov. 1807.) form the strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of which gained the victory at Baylen, while the latter contended for it, although ineffectually, at Rio Seco.

The French force, destined to invade Portugal, was already assembled at Bayonne, under the title of the "First army of the Garonne," and actually entered Spain before the treaty was signed. It was commanded by General Junot, a young man of a bold, ambitious disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he was able to support; and his soldiers, principally conscripts, were ill fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them. At first by easy marches, and in small divisions, he led his troops through Spain, but the inhabitants, either from a latent fear of what was to follow, or from a dislike of foreigners common to all secluded people, were not friendly.† When the head of the columns reached Salamanca, the General halted, intending to complete the organization of his troops in that rich country, and there to await the most favorable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier which guarded

\* Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii.

† Thiebault, Exp. de Portugal.

his destined prey; but political events marched faster than his calculations, and fresh instructions from the Emperor prescribed an immediate advance upon Lisbon; Junot obeyed, and the family of Braganza, at his approach, fled to the Brazils. The series of interesting transactions which attended this invasion will be treated of hereafter; at present, I must return to Spain, now bending to the first gusts of that hurricane, which soon swept over her with destructive violence.

The accusation of treason and intended parricide preferred by Charles IV. against his son Ferdinand, (Dec. 1807,) gave rise to some judicial proceedings, which ended in the submission of the Prince, who, being absolved of the imputed crime, wrote a letter to his father and mother, acknowledging his own fault, but accusing the persons in his confidence of being the instigators of deeds which he himself abhorred.\* The intrigues of his advisers, however, continued, and the plans of Napoleon advanced as a necessary consequence of the divisions in the Spanish court.

By the terms of the convention of Fontainebleau, forty thousand men were to be held in reserve at Bayonne; but a greater number were assembled on different points of the frontier, and in the course of December, two corps had entered the Spanish territory, and were quartered in Vittoria, Miranda, Briviesca, and the neighborhood. The one, commanded by General Dupont, was called the second army of observation of the "Gironde." The other, commanded by Marshal Monecy, took the title of the army of observation of the "Côte d'Ocean." In the gross, they amounted to fifty-three thousand men, of which above forty thousand were fit for duty;† and in the course of the month of December, Dupont advanced to Valladolid, while a reinforcement for Junot, four thousand seven hundred in number, took up their quarters at Salamanca. It thus appeared as if the French troops were quietly following the natural line of communication between France and Portugal; but in reality, Dupont and Monecy's positions cut off the capital from all intercourse with the northern provinces, and secured the direct road from Bayonne to Madrid.‡ Small divisions under different pretexts continually reinforced these two bodies, and through the Eastern Pyrenees twelve thousand men, commanded by General Duhesme, penetrated into Catalonia, and established themselves in Barcelona.

In the mean time the dispute between the King (March, 1808)

\* Nellerio. Historia de la Guerra contra Nap.

† Return of the French army, Appendix, Journal of Dupont's Operations, MSS.

‡ Notes of Napoleon, found in the portfolio of King Joseph at the battle of Vittoria. Appendix, No. 2.

and his son, or rather between the Prince of the Peace and the advisers of Ferdinand, was brought to a crisis by insurrections at Aranjuez and Madrid, which took place upon the 17th, 18th, and 19th of March, 1808. The old King, deceived by intrigues, or frightened at the difficulties which surrounded him, had determined, as it is supposed by some, to quit Spain, and take refuge in his American dominions, and preparations were made for a flight to Seville, when the Prince's grooms commenced a tumult, in which the populace of Aranjuez soon joined, and were only pacified by the assurance that no journey was in contemplation.

Upon the 18th, the people of Madrid, following the example of Aranjuez, sacked the house of the obnoxious Manuel Godoy, and upon the 19th, the riots having recommenced at Aranjuez, that minister secreted himself; but his retreat being discovered, he was maltreated, and on the point of being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him. Charles IV., terrified by the violent proceedings of his subjects, had abdicated the day before, and this event being proclaimed at Madrid on the 20th, Ferdinand was declared King, to the great joy of the nation at large: little did the people know what they rejoiced at, and time has since taught them that the fable of the frogs demanding a monarch had its meaning.

During these transactions (March, 1808) Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, who had taken the command of all the French troops in Spain, quitted his quarters at Aranda de Duero, passed the Somosierra, and entered Madrid the 23d, with Moncey's corps and a fine body of cavalry; Dupont at the same time, deviating from the road to Portugal, crossed the Duero, and occupied Segovia, the Escorial, and Aranjuez. Ferdinand, who arrived at Madrid on the 24th, was not recognized by Murat as King; nevertheless, at the demand of his powerful guest, he delivered to him the sword of Francis I. with much ceremony. Meanwhile Charles protested to Murat that his abdication had been forced, and also wrote to Napoleon in the same strain. This state of affairs being unexpected by the Emperor, he sent General Savary to conduct his plans, which appear to have been considerably deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation with which Murat had seized the capital.\* But previous to Savary's arrival, Don Carlos, the brother of Ferdinand, departed from Madrid, hoping to meet the Emperor Napoleon, whose presence in that city was confidently expected; and upon the 10th of April, Ferdinand, having first appointed a supreme junta, of which his uncle, Don Antonio, was named president and Murat a member, commenced

\* Napoleon in Las Casas.

his own remarkable journey to Bayonne. The true causes of this measure have not yet been developed; perhaps, when they shall be known, some petty personal intrigue may be found to have had a greater influence than the grand machinations attributed to Napoleon, who could not have anticipated, much less have calculated a great political scheme upon such a surprising example of weakness.

The people everywhere manifested their anger at this journey; in Vittoria they cut the traces of Ferdinand's carriage, and at different times several gallant men offered, at the risk of their lives, to carry him off by sea, in defiance of the French troops quartered along the road. Unmoved by their entreaties and zeal, and regardless of the warning contained in a letter that he received at this period from Napoleon, (who, withholding the title of majesty, sharply reproved him for his past conduct, and scarcely expressed a wish to meet him,) Ferdinand continued his progress, and, on the 20th of April, 1808, found himself a prisoner in Bayonne. In the mean time, Charles, under the protection of Murat, resumed his authority, obtained the liberty of Godoy, and quitting Spain, also threw himself, his cause and kingdom, into the Emperor's hands.

These events were in themselves quite enough to urge a more cautious people than the Spaniards into action; but other measures had been pursued, which proved beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the country was destined to be the spoil of the French. The troops of that nation had been admitted, without reserve or precaution, into the different fortresses upon the Spanish frontier, and, taking advantage of this hospitality to forward the views of their chief, they got possession, by various artifices, of the citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, of Pampeluna in Navarre, and of the forts of Figueras and Monjuik, and the citadel of Barcelona, in Catalonia. Thus, under the pretence of mediating between the father and the son, in a time of profound peace, a foreign force was suddenly established in the capital, on the communications, and in the principal frontier fortresses; its chief was admitted to a share of the government, and a fiery, proud, and jealous nation was laid prostrate at the feet of a stranger, without a blow being struck, without one warning voice being raised, without a suspicion being excited in sufficient time to guard against those acts upon which all were gazing with stupid amazement.

It is idle to attribute this surprising event to the subtlety of Napoleon's policy, to the depth of his deceit, or to the treachery of Godoy; such a fatal calamity could only be the result of bad government, and the consequent degradation of public feeling. It matters but little to those who wish to derive a lesson from expe-

rience, whether it be a Godoy or a Savary that strikes the last bargain of corruption, the silly father or the rebellious son that signs the final act of degradation and infamy. Fortunately, it is easier to oppress the people of all countries, than to destroy their generous feelings; when all patriotism is lost among the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower; in the Peninsula it was not found, but started into life with a fervor and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst forth attended by many evils; the good feeling displayed was the people's own, their cruelty, folly, and perverseness were the effects of a long course of misgovernment.

There are many reasons why Napoleon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. The Spanish Bourbons could never have been sincere friends to France while Bonaparte held the sceptre, and the moment that the fear of his power ceased to operate, it was quite certain that their apparent friendship would change to active hostility; the proclamation issued by the Spanish cabinet just before the battle of Jena was evidence of this fact. But if the Bourbons were Napoleon's enemies, it did not follow that the people sympathized with their rulers; his great error was that he looked only to the court, and treated the nation with contempt. Had he, before he openly meddled in their affairs, brought the people into hostile contact with their government,—and how many points would not such a government have offered!—instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people.

The journey of Ferdinand, the liberation of Godoy, the flight of Charles, the appointing Murat to be a member of the governing junta, and the movements of the French troops who were advancing from all parts towards Madrid, aroused the indignation of the nation, and tumults and assassinations had taken place in various parts; at Toledo, a serious riot occurred on the 25d of April, the peasants joined the inhabitants of the town, and it was only by the advance of a division of infantry and some cavalry of Dupont's corps, then quartered at Aranjuez, that order was restored.\* The agitation of the public mind, however, increased; the French troops were all young men, or rather boys, taken from the last conscription, and disciplined after they had entered Spain; their youth and apparent feebleness excited the contempt of the Spaniards, who pride themselves much upon individual prowess, and the swelling indignation at last broke out.

\* Journal of Dupont's Operations, MSS.

Upon the 2d of May, a carriage being prepared, as the people supposed, to convey Don Antonio, the uncle of Ferdinand, to France, a crowd collected about it; their language indicated a determination not to permit the last of the royal family to be spirited away, the traces of the carriage were cut, and loud imprecations against the French burst forth on every side; at that moment Colonel La Grange, aide-de-camp to Murat, appeared—he was assailed and maltreated, and in an instant the whole city was in commotion. The French soldiers, expecting no violence, were killed in every street; about four hundred fell, and the hospital was attacked, but the attendants and sick men defended themselves; and meanwhile the alarm having spread to the camp outside the city, the French cavalry galloped in to the assistance of their countrymen by the gate of Alcala, while General Lanfranc, with three thousand infantry, descending from the heights on the north-west quarter, entered the Calle Ancha de Bernardo. As he crossed the end of the street Maravelles, Daois and Velarde, two Spanish officers who were in a state of great excitement, discharged a cannon at the passing troops, and were immediately attacked and killed by some voltigeurs; the column, however, continued its march, releasing, as it advanced, several superior officers, who were in a manner besieged by the populace. The cavalry at the other end of the town, treating the affair as a tumult, and not as an action, made some hundred prisoners, and some men were killed or maimed by the horses; but Marshal Monecy, General Harispe, and Gonzalvo O'Farril restored order.\* Nevertheless, after nightfall, the peasantry of the neighborhood, who were armed and in considerable numbers, beset the city gates, and the French guards, firing upon them, killed twenty or thirty, and wounded more.

In the first moment of irritation, Murat ordered all the prisoners to be tried by a military commission, which condemned them to death; but the municipality interfering, represented to that prince the extreme cruelty of visiting this angry ebullition of an injured and insulted people with such severity, whereupon, admitting the weight of their arguments, he forbade any executions on the sentence. Yet it is said that General Grouchy, in whose immediate power the prisoners remained, after exclaiming that his own life had been attempted, that the blood of the French soldiers was not to be spilt with impunity, and that the prisoners, having been condemned by a council of war, ought and should be executed, proceeded to shoot them in the Prado. Forty were thus slain before Murat could cause his orders to be effectually obeyed. The next day some of the Spanish authorities having discovered that

\* Memoir of Azanza and O'Farril.



a colonel commanding the imperial guards still retained a number of prisoners in the barracks, applied to have them also released. Murat consented, but it is said by some, although denied by others of greater authority, that the colonel getting intelligence of what was passing, and being enraged at the loss of so many choice soldiers, put forty-five of his captives to death before the order arrived to stay his bloody proceedings.\*

Such were nearly the circumstances that attended this celebrated tumult, in which the wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard; and as many authors, adopting without hesitation all the reports of the day, have represented it, sometimes as a wanton and extensive massacre on the part of the French, sometimes as a barbarous political stroke to impress a dread of their power, I think it necessary to remark—First, that it was commenced by the Spaniards; their fiery tempers, the irritation produced by passing events, and the habits of violence which they had acquired in their late successful insurrection against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable. Second, that if the French had secretly stimulated this disposition, and had resolved in cold blood to make a terrible example, they would have prepared some check on the Spanish soldiers of the garrison; they would not have left their own hospital unguarded, still less have arranged the plan so that their loss should far exceed that of the Spaniards; and surely nothing would have induced them to relinquish the profit of such policy after having suffered all the injury! Yet Marshal Monecy and General Harispe were actively engaged in restoring order; and it is certain that, including the peasants shot outside the gates, and the executions afterwards, the whole number of Spaniards slain did not amount to one hundred and twenty persons, while several hundred French fell.† Of the imperial guards seventy men were wounded, and this fact alone would suffice to prove that there was no premeditation on the part of Murat;‡ for if he was base enough to sacrifice his own men with such unconcern, he would not have exposed the select soldiers of the French empire in preference to the conscripts who abounded in his army.

The affair itself was certainly accidental, and not very bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute secret motives, and to exaggerate the slaughter. The Spaniards in the provinces, impressed with an opinion of French atrocity, were thereby excited to insurrection on the one hand; and, on the other, the French, well aware that such an impression could not be effaced

\* See Gen. Harispe's observations at the end of this work.

† Manifesto of the Council of Castile, page 28.

‡ Surgical Campaigns of Baron Larrey.

by an accurate relation of what did happen, seized the occasion to convey a terrible idea of their own power and severity. It is the part of history to reduce such amplifications. But it is impossible to remain unmoved in recording the gallantry and devotion of a populace that could thus dare to assail the force commanded by Murat, rather than abandon one of their princes; such, however, was the character of the Spaniards throughout this war, they were prone to sudden and rash actions, and though weak in military execution, fierce and confident individually, and they had always an intuitive perception of what was great and noble.

The commotion of the 2d of May was the forerunner of insurrections in every part of Spain, few of which were so honorable to the actors as that of Madrid. Unprincipled villains hailed the opportunity of directing the passions of the multitude, and under the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people against whomever it pleased them to rob or to destroy. Pillage, massacres, assassinations, cruelties of the most revolting kind, were everywhere perpetrated, and the intrinsic goodness of the cause was disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville, Badajoz, and other places, but chiefly at Valencia, pre-eminent in barbarity at a moment when all were barbarous! The first burst of popular feeling being thus misdirected, and the energy of the people wasted in assassinations, lassitude and fear succeeded to the insolence of tumult at the approach of real danger; for it is one thing to shine in the work of butchery, and another to establish that discipline which can alone sustain the courage of the multitude in the hour of trial.

To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than the terms of the convention warranted, a variety of reports relative to the ultimate intentions of the French Emperor had been propagated; at one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers were dispatched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain and Barbary; at another, Portugal was to become the theatre of great events; and a mysterious importance was attached to all the movements of the French armies, with a view to deceive a court that fear and sloth disposed to the belief of anything but the truth, and to impose upon a people whose unsuspecting ignorance was at first mistaken for tameness.

In the mean time, active agents were employed to form a French party at the capital; and, as the insurrections of Aranjuez and Madrid discovered the fierceness of the Spanish character, Napoleon enjoined more caution and prudence upon his lieutenant than the latter was disposed to practise. In fact, Murat's precipitation was the cause of hastening the discovery of his master's real views

before they were ripe for execution. For Dupont's first division and cavalry had crossed the Duero as early as the 14th of March, and upon the 10th of April had occupied Aranjuez, while his second and third divisions took post at the Escorial and at Segovia, thus encircling the capital, which was soon occupied by Moncey's corps. It was then evident that Murat designed to control the provisional government left by Ferdinand; and the riot at Toledo, although promptly quelled by the interference of the French troops, indicated the state of the public mind, before the explosion at Madrid had placed the parties in a state of direct hostility. Murat seems to have been intrusted with only a half confidence, and as his natural impetuosity urged him to play a rash rather than a timid part, he appeared with the air of a conqueror before a ground of quarrel was laid. His policy was too coarse and open for such difficult affairs, yet he was not entirely without grounds for his proceeding; a letter addressed to him about this time by Napoleon contained these expressions: "*The Duke of Infantado has a party in Madrid; it will attack you; dissipate it, and seize the government.*"

At Bayonne the political events kept pace with those of Madrid. Charles IV. having reclaimed his rights in presence of Napoleon, commanded the infant, Don Antonio, to relinquish the presidency of the governing Junta to Murat, who at the same time received the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. This appointment, and the restoration of Charles to the regal dignity, were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquiescence of the Council of Castile, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period the old monarch had again ceded his authority to Napoleon, and Ferdinand and himself were consigned, with large pensions, to the tranquillity of private life. The throne of Spain being thus rendered vacant, the right to fill it was assumed by the French Emperor, in virtue of the cession made by Charles IV., and he desired that a king might be chosen from his own family. After some hesitation, the Council of Castile, in concert with the municipality of Madrid and the governing Junta, declared that their choice had fallen upon Joseph Bonaparte, who was then King of Naples; and Cardinal Bourbon, Primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and Archbishop of Toledo, not only acceded to this arrangement, but actually wrote to Napoleon a letter testifying his adhesion to the new order of things. As it was easy to foretell the result of the election, the King of Naples was already journeying towards Bayonne, where he arrived on the 7th of June. The principal men of Spain had been previously invited to meet in that town upon the 15th, with a view to obtain their assent to a constitution prepared by Napoleon; and at this meeting, called "The Assembly of Notables," ninety-

one Spaniards of eminence appeared. They accepted Joseph as their king, proceeded to discuss the constitution in detail, and after several sittings adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions. Thus finished the first part of this eventful drama.

The new constitution was calculated to draw forth all the resources of Spain; compared to the old system it was a blessing, and it would have been received as such under different circumstances, but now arms were to decide its fate, for in every province the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, and the Asturias, the people were gathering, and fiercely declaring their determination to resist French intrusion. Nevertheless, Joseph, apparently contented with the acquiescence of the ninety-one notables, and trusting to the powerful support of his brother, crossed the frontier on the 9th of July, and on the 12th arrived at Vittoria. The inhabitants, still remembering the journey to Bayonne, seemed disposed to hinder his entrance; but their opposition did not break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued his progress by Miranda del Ebro, Breviesca, Burgos, and Buitrago. The 20th of July he entered Madrid, and on the 24th he was proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies, with all the solemnities usual upon such occasions, thus making himself the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a nation's hatred! With a strange accent, and from the midst of foreign bands, he called upon a fierce and haughty race to accept of a constitution which they did not understand, and which few of them had ever heard of, his only hope of success resting on the strength of his brother's arms, his claims upon the consent of an imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch!

## CHAPTER III.

Council of Castile refuses to take the oath of allegiance—Supreme Junta established at Seville—Marquis of Solano murdered at Cadiz, and the Conde d'Aguiar at Seville—Intercourse between Castanos and Sir Hew Dalrymple—General Spencer and Admiral Purvis offer to co-operate with the Spaniards—Admiral Rossily's squadron surrenders to Morla—General insurrection—Massacre at Valencia—Horrible murder of Filanghieri.

JOSEPH, being proclaimed King, required the Council of Castile to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution; but, with unexpected boldness, that body, hitherto obsequious, met his orders with a remonstrance, for war, virtually declared on the 2d of May, was at this time raging in all parts of the Peninsula, and the Council was secretly apprised that a great misfortune had befallen the French arms.\* It was no longer a question between Joseph and some reluctant public bodies; it was an awful struggle between great nations; and how the spirit of insurrection, breaking forth simultaneously in every province, was nourished in each until it acquired the consistence of regular warfare, I will now relate.

Just before the tumult of Aranjuez, the Marquis of Solano y Socoro, commanding the Spanish auxiliary force in the Alemtejo, had received an order from Godoy to withdraw his division and post it on the frontier of Andalusia, to cover the projected journey of Charles IV. Napoleon was aware of this order, but would not interrupt its execution, wherefore Solano quitted Portugal without difficulty, and in the latter end of May, observing the general agitation, repaired to his government of Cadiz, in the harbor of which place five French sail of the line and a frigate, under Admiral Rossily, had just before taken refuge from the English fleet. Seville was in a great ferment, and Solano, in passing through, was required to put himself at the head of an insurrection in favor of Ferdinand VII. He refused, and passed on to his own government; but there, also, the people were ripe for a declaration against the French. A local government was established at Seville, which, assuming the title of "Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies," declared war in form against the intrusive monarch, commanded all men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five to take arms, called upon the troops of the camp of San Roque to acknowledge their authority, and ordered Solano to attack the French squadron. That unfortunate man would not acknowledge the

\* Memoir of O'Farril, and Azanza.

authority of this self-constituted government, and as he hesitated to commit his country in war against a power whose strength he knew better than he did the temper of his own countrymen, he was murdered. His ability, his courage, his amiable and unblemished character, have never been denied; and yet there is too much reason to believe that the Junta of Seville sent an agent to Cadiz for the express purpose of procuring his assassination. This foul stain upon the cause was enlarged by the perpetration of similar, or worse deeds, in every part of the kingdom. At Seville, the Conde d'Aguilar was dragged from his carriage, and, without even the imputation of guilt, inhumanly butchered; and here again it is said that the mob were instigated by a leading member of the Junta, Count Gusman de Tilly, a man described as "capable of dishonoring a whole nation by his crimes," while his victim was universally admitted to be virtuous and accomplished.

As early as April, General Castaños, then commanding the camp of San Roque, had entered into communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the Governor of Gibraltar. He was resolved to seize any opportunity that offered to resist the French, and he appears to have been the first Spaniard who united patriotism with prudent calculation,—readily acknowledging the authority of the Junta of Seville, and stifling the workings of self-interest, with a virtue by no means common to his countrymen at that period. When the insurrection first broke out, Admiral Purvis commanded the British squadron off Cadiz, and, in concert with General Spencer, who happened to be in that part of the world with five thousand men, offered to co-operate with Solano in an attack upon the French ships of war in the harbor. Upon the death of that unfortunate man, this offer was renewed and pressed upon Don Thomas Morla, his successor; but he, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, refused all assistance, and reduced the hostile ships himself. Castaños, however, united himself closely with the British commanders, and obtained from them supplies of arms, ammunition, and money; and at the instance of Sir Hew Dalrymple the merchants of Gibraltar advanced a loan of forty-two thousand dollars for the service of the Spanish patriots.\*

Meanwhile the assassinations at Cadiz and Seville were imitated in every part of Spain; hardly can a town be named in which some innocent and worthy persons were not slain.† Grenada had its murders; Carthagená rivalled Cadiz in ruthless cruelty, and Valencia reeked with blood. Don Miguel de Saavedra, the governor of that city, was killed, not in the first fury of commotion,

\* Sir Hew Dalrymple's correspondence.

† Moniteur. Azanza and O'Farril: Nellerto,



which he escaped, but having returned, was deliberately sacrificed. Balthazar Calvo, a canon of the church of San Isido, at Madrid, came down to Valencia, and having collected a band of fanatics, commenced a massacre of the French residents; and this ruthless villain continued his slaughters unchecked until, French victims failing, his raging thirst for murder urged him to menace the Junta, who, with the exception of the English consul, Mr. Tupper, had given way to his previous violence, but now readily found the means to crush his power. The canon, while in the act of braving their authority, was seized by stratagem, and soon afterwards strangled, together with two hundred of his band. The Conde de Serbelloni, Captain-General of the province, then proceeded to organize an army; and the old Count Florida Blanca placed himself at the head of the Murcian insurrection, and his force acted in unison with that of Valencia.

In Catalonia the occupation of Barcelona repressed the popular effervescence, but the feeling was the same, and an insurrection, breaking out at the town of Manresa, soon spread to all the unfettered parts of the province.

In Aragon the arrival of Don Joseph Palafox kindled the fire of patriotism. He had escaped from Bayonne, and his family were greatly esteemed in a country where it was of the noblest among a people absurdly vain of their ancient descent. The Captain-General, fearful of a tumult, ordered Palafox to quit the province, but this circumstance, joined to some appearance of mystery in his escape from Bayonne, increased the passions of the multitude; a crowd surrounded his abode, and forced him to assume the command, the Captain-General was confined, some persons were murdered, and a junta was formed. Palafox was considered by his companions as a man of slender capacity and great vanity, and there is nothing in his exploits to create a doubt of the justness of this opinion; it was not Palafox that upheld the glory of Aragon; it was the spirit of the people, which he had not excited, and could so little direct, that for a long time after the commencement of the first siege, he was kept a sort of prisoner in Zaragoza, his courage and fidelity being distrusted by the population which he is supposed to have ruled.

The example of Aragon aroused the Navarrese, and Logrono became the focus of an insurrection which extended along most of the valleys of that kingdom. In the northern and western provinces, the spirit of independence was equally fierce and as decidedly pronounced, accompanied also by the same excesses. In Badajos the Conde de la Torre del Frenio was butchered by the populace, and his mangled carcass dragged through the streets in triumph.

At Talavera de la Reyna, the corregidor with difficulty escaped a similar fate by a hasty flight; Leon presented a wide, unbroken scene of anarchy, and, generally speaking, in all the great towns violent hands were laid upon those who opposed the people's wishes.

Gallicia seemed to hold back for a moment, but the example of Leon, and the arrival of an agent from the Asturias, where the insurrection was in full force, produced a general movement. A junta was formed, and Filanghieri, the Governor of Coruña, an Italian, was called upon to exercise the functions of royalty by declaring war in form against France. Like every man of sense in Spain he was unwilling to commence a revolution upon such uncertain grounds, and the impatient populace sought his death; he was saved at the moment by the courage of an officer of his staff, yet his horrible fate was only deferred. Being a man of talent and sincerely attached to Spain, he exerted himself to organize the military resources of the province, and no suspicion attached to his conduct; but such was the inherent ferocity of the people and of the time, that the soldiers of the regiment of Navarre seized him at Villa Franca del Bierzo, and, as some say, stuck him full of bayonets, while others assert that they planted their weapons in the ground, and then tossing him on to their points, left him there to struggle, and then disbanded themselves.

The Asturians were the first who proclaimed their indefeasible right of choosing a new government when the old one ceased to afford them protection. They established a local junta, declared war against the French, and dispatched deputies to England to solicit assistance. Meanwhile, although the great towns in Biscay and the Castiles were overawed by fifty thousand bayonets, the peasantry commenced a war, in their own manner, against the stragglers and the sick, and thus a hostile chain surrounding the French army was completed in every link.

This universal and nearly simultaneous effort of the Spanish people was beheld by the rest of Europe with astonishment and admiration: astonishment at the energy thus suddenly put forth by a nation hitherto deemed unnerved and debased; admiration at the devoted courage of an act, which, seen at a distance and its odious parts unknown, appeared with all the ideal beauty of Numantian patriotism. In England the enthusiasm was unbounded; dazzled at first with the splendor of such an agreeable, unlooked-for spectacle, men of all classes gave way to the impulse of a generous sympathy, and forgot, or felt disinclined to analyze, the real causes of this apparently magnanimous exertion. It may, however, be fairly doubted if the disinterested vigor of the Spanish character

was the true source of the resistance ; it was, in fact, produced by several co-operating causes, many of which were anything but commendable. Constituted as modern states are, with little in their systems of government or education adapted to nourish intense feelings of patriotism, it would be miraculous indeed if such a result was obtained from the pure virtue of a nation, which for two centuries had groaned under the pressure of civil and religious despotism.

The Spanish character, with relation to public affairs, is distinguished by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory and improvident, the individual as well as the mass all possess an absurd confidence that everything is practicable which their heated imaginations suggest ; once excited, they can see no difficulty in the execution of a project, and the obstacles they encounter are attributed to treachery ; hence the sudden murder of so many virtuous men at the commencement of this commotion. Kind and warm in his attachments, but bitter in his anger, the Spaniard is patient under privations, firm in bodily suffering, prone to sudden passion, vindictive, bloody, remembering insult longer than injury, and cruel in his revenge. With a strong natural perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but as he invariably permits his passions to get the mastery of his reason, his performance is mean. In the progress of this war, the tenacity of vengeance peculiar to the nation supplied the want of cool, persevering intrepidity ; but it was a poor substitute for that essential quality, and led rather to deeds of craft and cruelty than to daring acts of patriotism. Now the abstraction of the royal family, and the unexpected pretension to the crown, so insultingly put forth by Napoleon, had aroused all the Spanish pride, and the tumults of Madrid and Aranjuez prepared the public mind for a violent movement ; the protection afforded by the French to the obnoxious Godoy increased the ferment of popular feeling, because a dearly cherished vengeance was thus frustrated at the moment of its expected accomplishment, and the disappointment excited all that fierceness of anger which with Spaniards is, for the moment, uncontrollable ; and then came the tumult of Madrid, which, swollen and distorted, was cast like Cæsar's body before the people to urge them to phrenzy ; they arose, not to meet a danger the extent of which they had calculated, and were prepared for the sake of independence to confront, but to gratify the fury of their hearts, and to slake their thirst of blood.

During Godoy's administration the property of the church had been trenced upon, and it was evident, from the example of France and Italy, that under the new system the operation would be re-